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Information Asymmetry and the
Protection of Ordinary Investors
Kevin S. Haeberle*
To some, the reductions in information asymmetry provided by the main
securities-specific disclosure, fraud, and insider-trading laws help ordinary
investors in meaningful ways. To others, whatever their larger social value,
such reductions do little, if anything for these investors. For decades, these
two sides of this investor-protection divide have mostly talked past each other.
This Article builds on economic theory to reveal something striking: The
reductions in information asymmetry provided by the core securities laws
likely impose a long-overlooked cost on buy-and-hold ordinary investors.
More specifically, I explain why there is much reason to believe that the
reductions take away investment return from these investors, while
providing them with only limited benefits. Thus, the article presents a
serious challenge to conventional wisdom on information asymmetry and
the protection of ordinary investors, and argues in favor of a shift in
investor-protection efforts away from the main securities laws and to areas
of regulation that have received relatively little attention to date.
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INTRODUCTION
Many have long maintained that the core securities laws’ dampening
effect on information asymmetry is a good thing for the ordinary
individuals who invest in the stock market. Whatever their view on the
larger social value of reducing this asymmetry, law and economics
scholars have disputed the idea that these disclosure, fraud, and insider
trading rules help these individuals. As Professors Easterbrook and
Fischel memorably put it, the investor-protection rationale “is as
unsophisticated as the investors it is supposed to protect.”1 However, to
date, the criticism has largely been limited to the idea that reducing
information asymmetry is a more or less neutral — and therefore
wasteful — proposition from the perspective of these investors (qua
investors).
This Article takes a closer look at how the reductions in stock market2
information asymmetry provided by the core securities laws affect
ordinary investors. In particular, it builds on economic theory to show
something striking: Those reductions likely take away investment
return for buy-and-hold ordinary investors, while assisting them in only
limited ways. The identification of these effects should result in a better
understanding of securities law — one that helps bridge the investorprotection divide introduced above. It should also shift any focus on
investor-protection efforts to less prominent areas of regulation, such
as those relating to trading market structure and investment advisor
duties.
It has long been said that the core securities laws reduce information
asymmetry among stock market participants. However, for decades
now, there has been a great divide on the implications of any such
reduction for the ordinary individuals who invest in the market.3 (These
individuals include everyone from mom and pop investors to other non1 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 694 (1984) [hereinafter Mandatory
Disclosure]; see also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 297 (1996) [hereinafter ECONOMIC STRUCTURE].
2 My use of the term “stock market” in this Article generally refers only to the
secondary market for public company stock in the United States. Any examination of
efforts to reduce informational unevenness in related markets might result in different
conclusions. See, e.g., Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency
Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1049-50 (1995) (discussing the likely effects of
mandating issuer disclosure to prevent extraction of value from ordinary investors by
unscrupulous promoters in the IPO market).
3 The investor-protection divide extends beyond issues relating to information
asymmetry. My focus in this Article is specific to information asymmetry and the wellbeing of ordinary investors.
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professional, outside investors with far more wealth than the typical
investor. Informally stated, the group includes all everyday individual
investors, with the line between them and the pros drawn somewhere
short of George Soros and peers.) On one side of the divide are those
regulators, legislators, judges, and scholars who can be termed investorprotection advocates. They view informational unevenness as a negative
thing for these investors, and applaud efforts to reduce it on their
behalf.4 On the other side is what I call the law and economics
orthodoxy. Lawmakers and scholars in this camp generally view the
unevenness as a neutral proposition for ordinary investors, and
challenge at least the rationale of the relevant laws.5
For the investor-protection advocates, the good work done by the
core securities laws is clear. The required disclosure gets valuable

4 The most prominent examples of this view are found in the insider trading and
disclosure timing contexts. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 251 (1980)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that “persons having access to confidential material
information that is not legally available to others generally are prohibited . . . from
engaging in schemes to exploit their structural informational advantage through trading
in affected securities”; Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590,
72,592 (Dec. 28, 1999) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 240, 243, 249) (stating that
the main goal of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) fair disclosure rule
requiring simultaneous disclosure of material information is to help increase
“fundamental fairness to all investors”); Joel Seligman, The Reformulation of Federal
Securities Law Concerning Nonpublic Information, 73 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1090 (1985)
(advocating for a “parity of information” approach to insider trading law); id. at 1115
(“The primary policy reason for proscribing trading while in possession of material
nonpublic information is to make investors confident that they can trade securities
without being subject to informational disadvantages.”). The investor-protection view
continues to animate the law today. See, e.g., Brief for the United States at 18, Salman v.
United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016) (No. 15-628), 2016 WL 4088380, at *18 (focusing
on “the unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to take advantage of . . . information”
unavailable to outsiders (quotation marks omitted)).
5 For prominent dismissals of investor-protection rationales, see Easterbrook &
Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 1 (focusing primarily on mandatorydisclosure law). See also Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of
Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 713 (2006) [hereinafter Essential Role] (“Any
serious examination of the role and function of securities regulation must sidestep the
widespread, yet misguided, belief that securities regulation aims at protecting the
common investor. Securities regulation is not a consumer protection law.”); Henry
Manne, In Defense of Insider Trading, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1966, at 113, 114
(1966) [hereinafter Defense] (“[T]he only stock market participants who are likely to
benefit from a rule preventing insider trading are the short-term speculators and traders,
not the long-term investors who are regularly stated to be the objects of the SEC’s
solicitude.”).
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information out beyond firms,6 the strong prohibition on fraud helps
ensure that the information is credible,7 and the restriction on insider
trading limits use of this same information before it is available to all.8
These interrelated laws9 therefore put ordinary investors, who are by
definition out in the cold beyond the firm, on a more level playing field
with insiders and sophisticated professional investors.10
To supporters of the law and economics view, the lessons from
modern finance (namely, those arising out of the efficient capital
markets hypothesis, with the implications of modern portfolio theory
rounding out the fuller story) dictate that these same laws do little, if
anything, for ordinary investors.11 Efficient markets, they argue,
guarantee that stocks are as likely to be overpriced as underpriced,12
thereby allowing ordinary investors to buy and sell at prices that are as

6 For a concise broad overview of securities disclosure law, see Kevin S. Haeberle
& M. Todd Henderson, A New Market-Based Approach to Securities Law, 85 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1313, 1321-23 (2018).
7 For a concise broad overview of securities fraud law, see id. at 1323-24.
8 For a concise broad overview of insider trading law, see id. at 1324-27.
9 The laws are intertwined in more than just obvious ways. For example, the
restriction on insider trading removes private value from inside information, thereby
incentivizing insiders to disclose it sooner. E.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading,
Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV.
309, 333 (1981) [hereinafter Insider Trading] (arguing that, if allowed to trade, insiders
would hold onto material information for personal gain via quiet trading in the market
over prolonged periods rather than sharing it with the public promptly); see also Zohar
Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Insider Trading, Markets, and “Negative” Property
Rights in Information, 87 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1264 (2001) [hereinafter On Insider Trading]
(“Absent competition, insiders have no incentive to quickly disclose inside
information.”). See generally Morris Mendelson, The Economics of Insider Trading
Reconsidered, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 470, 489 (1969) (reviewing HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER
TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966)). But see Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R.
Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 879 (1983) (“[I]nsider
trading in some cases may accelerate the speed of disclosure because the ability to profit
is dependent on information reaching the market.”); id. at 892.
10 See, e.g., Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24,
2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249) (noting that investors without
equal access to information “rightly question whether they are on a level playing field
with market insiders”).
11 The stance is specific to ordinary investors as investors. These scholars recognize
the benefits of the securities laws for all members of society through their effects on
capital allocation and corporate governance. See generally infra notes 52–53 and
accompanying text.
12 See generally Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and
Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970) (describing an efficient market).

150

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 53:145

likely to be inaccurately high as they are to be inaccurately low.13
Holding a portfolio of such stocks therefore allows ordinary investors
to diversify away firm-specific variance while still earning a return for
taking on undiversifiable market-wide risk.14 These conclusions hold
whether or not firms are required to share information with the public15
in a credible manner16 while restricting their insiders from trading on it
beforehand.17
Despite these strongly staked positions, the important effects of the
core securities laws on the ordinary individuals who invest — directly
or indirectly — in public company stock have been overlooked. The
existence of these effects can be seen by building on a variety of wellestablished, yet to date largely unconnected, principles of economics
and securities law.

13 See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox et al., Law, Share Price Accuracy, and Economic
Performance: The New Evidence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 331, 335-36, 336 n.13 (2003)
[hereinafter Share Price Accuracy] (stating that in an efficient market, “the possibility
that the [ordinary] investor will end up ex post worse off . . . by paying too much for
the share is no greater than the possibility that she will end up better off ex post by
paying too little”); Paul G. Mahoney, Precaution Costs and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal
Markets, 78 VA. L. REV. 623, 642-43 (1992); see also BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM
WALK DOWN WALL STREET: THE TIME-TESTED STRATEGY FOR SUCCESSFUL INVESTING 18384 (11th ed. 2016).
14 See, e.g., RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS, & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES
OF CORPORATE FINANCE 174-77 (11th ed. 2013); Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7
J. FIN. 77 (1952). For a popular account of modern portfolio theory and these general
dynamics, see MALKIEL, supra note 13, at 222-23.
15 See, e.g., Fox et al., Share Price Accuracy, supra note 13, at 335-36 (“[A] law
requiring issuers to disclose more information than they would otherwise voluntarily
disclose is unnecessary to protect ordinary investors from buying shares at prices that
are unfair in the sense of being on average greater than their actual values.”).
16 See, e.g., id.; Richard A. Booth, The End of the Securities Fraud Class Action as We
Know It, 4 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1, 11 (2007) (“[I]nvestors are fully protected from simple
securities fraud through diversification. They need no remedy.”).
17 See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 1, at 262
(stating that “the only investors who lose out to insiders are those who have already
decided to sell” at current market prices, and that “if managers are knocked out of the
market, [ordinary] investors are not the winners”); Manne, Defense, supra note 5, at 115
(“[T]he long-term investor may turn out to be the individual who in fact sells to the
insider. But since he is normally selling for reasons unrelated to the insider’s trading,
and would be selling in any event, he should be indifferent to the identity of his buyer.
Actually, he may benefit from the insider’s buying on good news, as the average price
received may be higher than without insider trading.”); see also Henry G. Manne, The
Case for Insider Trading, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 17, 2003, 12:03 AM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB104786934891514900 (“[I]nsider trading does little or no direct harm to any
individual trading in the market, even when an insider is on the other side of the
trades.”).
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The story begins with the costs of information asymmetry for
investors. Those costs are well-established in the economics literature
— specifically in that literature relating to market microstructure
economics.18 These costs mainly come in the form of reduced liquidity.
Specifically, they appear as part of the spread in between the prices at
which traders can buy and sell stock on demand (spread costs), and as
part of the movements in market prices that follow larger trading
activity (market-movement costs). Investors are also harmed by
information asymmetry as a result of steps they (and their investment
fund intermediaries) take to avoid these costs. These avoidance costs
include the loss of utility that results from opting not to trade in light
of the spread and/or market-movement costs, as well as any resources
expended on trading in a way that bypasses those costs.19
Microstructure, bridged with mainstream finance, has also
established that sophisticated buyers discount the price of illiquid
stocks, thereby preserving the expected return they demand on those

18 Market microstructure is a branch of economics focused on the forces at play
between buyers and sellers in markets. For a seminal treatise on microstructure
authored by a former chief economist of the SEC aimed at a broad audience, see
generally LARRY HARRIS, TRADING AND EXCHANGES: MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE FOR
PRACTITIONERS (2003). For decades, legal scholars failed to sufficiently consider
microstructure. This failure stands out in contrast to the tremendous focus on financial
economics by those scholars (and judges). Thus, incorporation of the microstructure
principles in focus below into the law has been limited despite robust incorporation of
the principles of financial economics into the same. For a prominent example in the
law, see Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988) (“Because most publicly
available information is reflected in market price, an investor’s reliance on any public
material misrepresentations, may be presumed for the purposes of a Rule 10b-5
action.”). For prominent examples from the scholarly literature on securities law, see
supra notes 11–17 and accompanying text. Notably, an emerging literature on
microstructure and the law now exists. See infra note 182 and accompanying text.
19 I briefly touch on all of these costs in Part II.A below, and detail them in a
contemporaneous work that, unlike the present ordinary investor-specific work, looks
at the problem of stock market information asymmetry from a social welfare
perspective. Kevin S. Haeberle, The Information-Asymmetry Story of Securities Regulation
[hereinafter Information-Asymmetry Story] (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author). Interestingly, one might argue that broader precaution costs incurred in
response to uncertainty in stocks’ fundamental values represent a cost of information
asymmetry. See Mahoney, supra note 13 (discussing work undertaken to identify fraud
to determine more accurate values). But even if one included the aforementioned
precaution costs in a broader analysis of information asymmetry, the analysis and
conclusions in this Article would remain substantially the same. In my related work on
information asymmetry from a social perspective, I think more about the extent to
which such precaution costs should factor into the information asymmetry story of
securities regulation more generally.
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financial instruments.20 This illiquidity discount is also relevant to the
information-asymmetry-based illiquidity presented in the form of
spread and market-movement costs. But, crucially, the close
examination of stock trading undertaken below shows that the discount
affects different investors differently — and that it presents a net benefit
to many.
More specifically, my theory starts with a basic premise: the discount
at issue is determined by the marginal investor.21 For that reason, the
size of the discount will reflect the impact of information asymmetry
costs on that investor. The identity of this unobservable investor remains
unknown.22 But the true impact of information-asymmetry-based
illiquidity on any investor turns on her investment horizon, as these
costs are amortized over that horizon and the return that comes along
with it.23 All else being equal, investors with shorter horizons are
therefore more susceptible to being harmed by these costs, and those
with longer ones less susceptible. But at least buy-and-hold ordinary
investors — namely, those who passively index the market (or some
part thereof) over the long haul — likely have investment horizons that
are significantly longer than those of this elusive marginal investor.24
Consequently, I argue, the prevailing discount is likely larger than that
necessary to compensate these longer-term investors for the
information asymmetry costs they incur. Paradoxically, these investors
therefore likely receive more of the very thing they target by investing

20 Such discounts were noted in a broad way by legal scholars as early as 1981. See
Easterbrook, Insider Trading, supra note 9, at 325. And some of their general securities
law and tax law implications were later modeled. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Back to Basics:
Regulating How Corporations Speak to the Market, 77 VA. L. REV. 945 (1991); Yair
Listokin, Taxation and Liquidity, 120 YALE L.J. 1682 (2011). But the seminal economics
work modeling these discounts in the 1980s has been largely overlooked by legal
scholars. That work and its progeny are discussed infra Part III.
21 See, e.g., Henry P. Shearman, PRACTICAL ECONOMICS 193 (1st ed. 1922).
22 See, e.g., John R. Graham, Do Taxes Affect Corporate Decisions? A Review, in
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE: CORPORATE FINANCE 150 (George M.
Constantinides, Milton Harris & René M. Stulz eds., 2013) (noting the fact that “the
identity . . . of the marginal investor(s) who set prices between debt and equity are
unknown”); see also Leonie Bell & Tim Jenkinson, New Evidence of the Impact of
Dividend Taxation and on the Identity of the Marginal Investor, 57 J. FIN. 1321, 1330-31
(2002).
23 I detail this point and ones following it in this paragraph in building on the
economics literature regarding the relationship between investor time horizon and
financial instrument liquidity. See discussion infra Part II.C.
24 I discuss the investment horizons associated with different types of investing
supra Part I, and connect that to my theory infra Part II.C.
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(expected return) thanks to the presence of better-informed
participants in the market.
To be clear, the added expected return — just like that associated
with risk25 — earned by a longer-term investor is not free. Even buyand-hold investors can gain utility from making trades with some
frequency — namely, by managing their portfolio risk to ensure it lines
up with their current preferences.26 To the extent buy-and-hold
investors earn an extra return thanks to information asymmetry, yet
maintain stock positions within their investment portfolio longer than
they otherwise would due to the same, their information asymmetry
premium comes at a cost. But to the extent the value of that premium
exceeds the cost of the lost portfolio adjustment these investors would
have pursued, they benefit from information asymmetry on net. Related
costs incurred in any effort to trade without having to pay the typical
spread and market-movement costs must also be considered.27 But
remarkably, for investors who are investing in the precise manner
suggested by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and
social science (i.e., by buying and holding a broad index),28 securitiesspecific compulsory disclosure, prohibitions on fraud, and limitations
on asymmetrically-informed trade are alarming.29
These positive theories have considerable implications for the
investor-protection divide and the law. With respect to the divide, they
dictate that each side is off, and that a more nuanced understanding of
information asymmetry and investor protection is in order. With
respect to the law, they suggest that any focus on protecting ordinary

25 See generally William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market
Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425 (1964); BREALEY ET AL., supra note
14, at 24-25.
26 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
27 See infra Parts II.A, III.A.
28 See infra note 134 and accompanying text.
29 Interestingly, some have noted how the disclosure and fraud laws can run against
the interests of buy-and-hold investors in other ways. E.g., Ayres, supra note 20, at 98990 (arguing that in a market where information is reflected in prices after some
reasonable period, “‘buy and hold [investors]’ . . . will want their managers to spend less
time and money talking to the market because there is a lower probability . . . that they
will sell in any given period”); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance,
Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059,
1070-71 (1990) (arguing that insiders should be able to make “strategic
misrepresentations [that benefit the firm] even in situations where nonpublic
information is leaked or where there is trading by insiders”); Mahoney, supra note 13,
at 634-35 (noting instances in which stockholders will prefer that the corporation make
false or misleading statements to the market).
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secondary market investors should be on tinkering with distinct laws
— and perhaps even on rolling back the core laws in focus here.
Of course, if firms and their executives disclosed little, lied often, and
traded frequently, stock market information asymmetry might be so
acute that it would cause serious trading frictions, if not the failure of
the market altogether.30 The result would not be good for ordinary
investors qua investors, as it would deprive them of opportunities to
invest. Nor would it be good for ordinary investors as citizens, as they
would lose out on living in a society where firms could raise capital
efficiently, among other things. Nonetheless, it must be remembered
that even the major laws under examination here have only a marginal
effect on information asymmetry. The precise size of that marginal effect
is subject to a distinct longstanding debate in securities law31 and well
beyond the scope of this Article. But it is worth highlighting here at the
outset that firms and their agents have market-based incentives to share
information in a credible manner without engaging in pre-disclosure
trading.32 Thus, my thesis is not that all reductions in information
asymmetry have the negative effects on buy-and-hold ordinary investors
introduced above while providing them with only limited assistance.
Instead, it is that the reductions in information asymmetry provided by
the core securities laws (i.e., reductions in information asymmetry at the
margin) have those negative effects and limited upside.
The fuller version of this story proceeds as follows. Part I provides
background on the stock market, specifically by describing the four
main types of trading pursued in it. Part II then builds on that
description, starting with a brief overview of the costs information
asymmetry imposes on market participants. It then offers the positive
theory on how the reduction of those costs provided by the laws in focus
affects buy-and-hold ordinary investors, and expands on that theory to
provide related insights about how that reduction affects ordinary
investors as a whole. Finally, Part IV explores what these theories
should mean for the investor-protection divide and the law.

30 See HARRIS, supra note 18, at 317 (“When the asymmetric information problem is
particularly severe . . . spreads may be so wide that no trading occurs,” thereby resulting
in “the market ha[ving] failed.”). Foreign stock markets have failed along these lines.
See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from
Securities Market Failure, 25 J. CORP. L. 1, 10-16 (1999) (comparing Poland’s success
with the Czech Republic’s failure following the fall of the Iron Curtain).
31 See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 144–147 and accompanying text.
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I.

THE FOUR MAIN TYPES OF TRADING

Investors may dominate our imagination when we think about those
participating in the stock market. But in the market itself, interactions
are between traders. Sometimes those traders are investors themselves.
Many individuals trade “directly” through online brokerage accounts.
So, too, do many institutions such as large insurance companies.
However, other times those traders are large investment funds, buying
and selling on behalf of a wide range of individual and institutional
investors. Here forward, I use this fine distinction between traders and
investors. Using it allows for a focus not only on those that buy and sell
in the market (the traders) and those whose capital is being ventured
(the investors), but also on the distinction between the two. This initial
Part therefore provides a quick overview of an increasingly prominent
model of the stock market that revolves around four main types of
trading (portfolio trading, information trading, noise trading, and
market making) and the investors who engage in them, directly or
indirectly.33 In so doing, it provides important background for the
theories about information asymmetry and ordinary investors offered in
the next Part.
A. Portfolio Trading
Portfolio trading centers on the accumulation, balancing, and
liquidation of the components of diversified portfolios of stocks.34
Those engaged in this trading target the healthy risk premium that has
traditionally been available to those who hold varied portfolios of public
company stock over sustained periods.35 Buy-and-hold ordinary
33 Models along these general lines are commonly found in microstructure works.
See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 18 (providing a similar model, albeit with additional detail
and sub-categories unnecessary for present purposes). They have also been present in
the securities law literature for some time. See, e.g., Goshen & Parchomovsky, On Insider
Trading, supra note 9, at 1239-40, 1243, and have been deployed with more frequency
over the past few years, infra note and accompanying text.
34 Some models of the stock market have referred to much of this type of trading
(namely, the liquidation of portfolios for consumption purposes) as that associated with
“liquidity trading.” See, e.g., Goshen & Parchomovsky, On Insider Trading, supra note 9,
at 1238-39. The nomenclature used in this Article is more in line with that found in the
emerging literature on microstructure and the law referenced supra note 18, and, in my
mind, more helpful to understanding trading strategies.
35 See ELROY DIMSON, PAUL MARSH & MIKE STAUNTON, TRIUMPH OF THE OPTIMISTS: 101
YEARS OF GLOBAL INVESTMENT RETURNS 42 (2002) (finding, on average, 6.7% afterinflation annual returns on public stocks in the United States over sustained investment
periods throughout the twentieth century). Gains over the long haul over the past
almost two decades have been consistent with these results. See, e.g., DIMENSIONAL FUND
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investors are usually engaged in this type of trading.36 Many merely buy
and hold a broad index of the entire market, and watch the index
balance itself as sample stocks increase or decrease in value.37 Others
similarly buy and hold, yet target a more specific set of stocks based on
their desire for a more specific risk and return. Still, even when
combined, these two sets of buy-and-hold investors make up only a
subset of the portfolio trading universe. After all, institutions engage in
portfolio trading as well.38 In the end, the general target here is the same
whether the capital at issue is supplied by ordinary individuals or
sophisticated institutions: an investment return derived from taking on
market-wide risk.
Investors often engage in portfolio trading directly. For example,
some buy-and-hold ordinary individuals take part of their surplus each
month and use it to purchase a broad sampling of public company stock
through a retail-level brokerage account. Over the years, they might

ADVISORS, MATRIX BOOK: 2017 (2017) (ebook) (showing an annualized nominal rate of
return of 9.6% for an index of domestic public firms since 2002).
36 See generally HARRIS, supra note 18, at 488-91 (discussing the buy-and-hold
approach); ZVI BODIE, ALEX KANE & ALAN J. MARCUS, INVESTMENTS 357 (10th ed. 2013)
(“A passive strategy aims only at establishing a well-diversified portfolio of securities
without attempting to find under- or overvalued stocks. Passive management is usually
characterized by a buy-and-hold strategy.”).
37 See, e.g., John C. Bogle, Reflections on ‘Toward Common Sense and Common
Ground?,’ 31 J. CORP. L. 31 (2007) (noting “the passive investment strategy followed by
the index fund — a fund that, in essence, owns the entire stock market . . . [and] carries
only tiny operating expenses and almost no portfolio transaction costs.”); Robert C.
Pozen, Curbing Short-Termism in Corporate America: Focus on Executive Compensation,
GOVERNANCE STUD. (Brookings Inst., D.C.), May 2014, at 2 (discussing “quasi-indexers”
as those with “highly diversified portfolios of publicly traded securities, and also a high
degree of ownership continuity since they seldom trade.”); Mahoney, supra note 13, at
636 (“[U]ninformed investors engage in no search. They act as price-takers and
consequently, do not attempt to ‘beat the market’ by trading on the basis of information
that happens to come their way. The rational uninformed investors will hold the market
portfolio and trade only in response to changes in her wealth or consumption.”).
38 E.g., Anne Tergesen & Jason Zweig, The Dying Business of Picking Stocks, WALL
ST. J. (Oct. 17, 2016, 12:12 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-dying-business-ofpicking-stocks-1476714749 (“Pension funds, endowments, 401(k) retirement plans
and retail investors are flooding into passive investment funds . . . . Public pension plans
had 60% of their U.S. stock allocations in index funds in 2015, up from 38% in 2012,
according to research from Greenwich Associates. At endowments and foundations, the
index-fund share rose to 63% from 40% in that time period.”); Our Clients, NUVEEN,
https://www.tiaa.org/public/assetmanagement/clients-we-serve (“We offer both
traditional and alternative strategies that seek to provide attractive long-term
investment solutions for endowments and foundations.”) (last visited Oct. 11, 2019);
see, e.g.,Solutions for Insurers, VANGUARD, https://institutional.vanguard.com/web/c1/
solutions/insurers/resources (last visited Oct. 12, 2019).
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adjust pieces of the portfolio they amass by purchasing stocks that are
thought to provide higher returns at higher risk, while selling off other
stocks (or perhaps bonds) associated with more conservative investing.
Or, if their personal tastes and preferences call for less risk, they might
do the opposite. For example, as their stock positions grow relative to
their bond and other holdings, they sell stocks to get back into their
optimal total investment portfolio. Whatever their exact approach
throughout the period in which they hold their portfolios, in the end,
these individuals generally seek to liquidate those portfolios in the
future to consume.
Still, most ordinary investor portfolio trading occurs indirectly
through investment fund intermediaries.39 For example, an average
individual retirement saver might make things easier on herself by
simply opting for some portion of her paycheck to go to a 401(k)
account every two weeks. Once the account is funded, investment funds
like those operated by Fidelity and Vanguard can do the portfolio
trading on her behalf. As a general matter, these institutional-level
traders are constantly engaging in portfolio trading to meet redemption
or subscription demands from investors based on the latter’s savings
versus consumption patterns. To the extent they are targeting a specific
segment of the market (namely, one with a specific risk characteristic),
these funds will also have to buy and sell to adjust their index from time
to time.
Insurance companies, university endowments, and a wide range of
wealthy extraordinary individuals and entities also entrust investment
funds to amass, maintain, and liquidate diversified portfolios of stocks
on their behalf.40 The especially wealthy in this group may even take
the steps necessary to engage in their portfolio trading directly, without
the help of outside investment intermediaries. All of these investors may
pursue a purely passive, broad indexing buy-and-hold approach to their
portfolio trading. But they also often opt for more active management
of even this type of “passive” portfolio.
Crucially, the great majority of stocks held in an indexed investment
are accumulated and held over sustained periods. For a direct trading
39 See Jesse Bricker et al., Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2013 to 2016:
Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, FED. RES. BULL., Sept. 2017, at 18-19
(noting that only 13.9% of families owned individual stocks, yet 52.1% invested through
retirement accounts); see also, e.g., INV. CO. INST., 2017 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK
30 (57th ed. 2017), https://www.ici.org/pdf/2017_factbook.pdf (“Retail investors (i.e.,
households) held the vast majority (89 percent) of the $16.3 trillion in US mutual fund
assets.”). The proportion of long-term mutual fund assets held by retail investors is even
higher (95 percent). See id.
40 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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retirement saver, this might mean accumulating their diversified
portfolio of stocks and holding much of it over the course of decades.41
Rebalancing investment positions in the portfolio in light of changing
risk preferences, stock-to-bond ratios, or the like to maximize investor
utility still plays a role for these direct traders and their indirect-trading
brethren. But indexing portfolio trading investors typically sell out of
only a small fraction of their holdings each year.42 Indeed, for those who
index the entire market, their portfolio of stocks balances itself
throughout the life of their investment. For example, Microsoft makes
up less of the portfolio when its value goes down relative to other
holdings in the portfolio, and more of the portfolio when its value
moves in the opposite direction.
B. Information Trading
Information trading, as the terminology suggests, mainly involves
buying and selling based on information as to companies’ fundamental
values that is not yet reflected in market prices.43 This trading centers
on the use of information to identify (and buy) stocks with market
prices that are lower than their fundamental values,44 and to spot (and
sell) stocks with market prices that are higher than their fundamental
values.45
Much information trading is attributable to sophisticated hedge
funds, private equity funds, and actively managed mutual funds.46

41

See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
43 Microstructure models focus on “informed trading.” See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note
18, at 6; Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten & Gabriel V. Rauterberg, Informed Trading
and Its Regulation, 43 J. CORP. L. 817, 825 (2018) [hereinafter Informed Trading]
(“Informed traders buy or sell a stock due to private information providing them with
a superior estimate of a stock’s value than that implied by the stock’s current price.”).
My focus on “information trading” is intentionally broader than this focus on only those
who are actually better informed than the market when they trade.
44 E.g., Fox et al., Informed Trading, supra note 43, at 826 (“Fundamental value
information arises from observing varied pieces of information that are publicly
available or involve observable features of the world and analyzing this information in
a sophisticated way that enables an assessment of a stock’s value superior to that implied
by the current market price.”); Goshen & Parchomovsky, Essential Role, supra note 5,
at 721 (“Pricing information requires analyzing the information to determine its value,
and then trading based on discrepancies between price and value.”) (emphasis added).
45 E.g., Fox et al., Informed Trading, supra note 43, at 826; Goshen & Parchomovsky,
Essential Role, supra note 5, at 721.
46 E.g., Fox et al., Informed Trading, supra note 43, at 826 (“Examples of
fundamental value information traders are actively managed mutual funds, hedge funds,
42
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However, like with portfolio trading, individuals too can engage in
information trading directly. While hopelessly outmatched by
institutional traders in the overwhelming majority of all cases, the
direct-trading little guy can win in this game at times. Sometimes such
wins come as a result of conduct that is illegal under insider trading law.
Other times it is perfectly consistent with the law, such as when it is the
product of skilled information collection and analysis by extraordinary
individuals working with bits and pieces of immaterial information
from firms47 or privately generated material information generated from
outside them.48
Although there are limits on hedge fund investing,49 all individuals,
whether ordinary or superiorly skilled, can engage in information
trading through at least actively managed mutual funds. There has long
been concern that many such funds are to some strong degree (or even
entirely) engaged in mere portfolio trading.50 To the extent an ordinary
investor is participating in the market through such a fund, the investor
is engaged in the relevant degree of portfolio trading and not
information trading. In other words, the ordinary investor is still
pursuing something at least closer to a buy-and-hold approach for some
part of the portfolio — even if more active management was
contemplated.
Whatever the precise nature of much “actively managed” trading, the
well-established positive externality that arises out of information
traders’ profit-seeking work should not be overlooked. As a byproduct
of their informed buying and selling, these traders bring new

pension funds, and the professionally managed portfolios of wealthy individuals and
non-profits.”).
47 E.g., id. at 869 n.165 (noting “trades based on one or more bits of non-public
immaterial information from within an issuer,” and stating that “existing interpretations
of Rule 10b-5 in fact do not find [this trading] illegal”).
48 E.g., id. at 883 (“[A] non-issuer institution that has generated information of
value for assessing an issuer’s stock (or has already purchased it, directly or indirectly,
from a person that has generated it) can use this information in three possible ways:
(1) trade on the information; (2) provide it privately to certain other traders; or
(3) announce the information publicly.”).
49 Generally, only “accredited investors” may invest with hedge funds. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.501(a) (2017). Accreditation is accomplished through surpassing either a net
worth threshold or an annual income threshold. Id. at § 230.501(a)(5)-(6).
50 E.g., Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. PA.
L. REV. 1961, 2018 (2010). Supporting the same underlying concerns, an earlier
empirical study concluded that “institutions as a whole seem to do little more than hold
the market portfolio.” See Jonathan Lewellen, Institutional Investors and the Limits of
Arbitrage, 102 J. FIN. ECON. 62, 77 (2011).
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information to the market.51 In this way, they help generate stock prices
that better reflect information dispersed throughout society52 — and
therefore the larger benefits that are thought to flow from those more
accurate prices.53 It is for this reason that commentators have long
extolled the virtues of these market participants’ efforts.54
Importantly, despite these benefits, information trading is at the root
of the concern for informational unevenness held by investorprotection advocates. This concern has traditionally been voiced as a
general one for fairness.55 But as I explain in Part II.A, market
microstructure economics provides a more tangible way of thinking
about the costs that better-informed traders impose on others.
Lastly, information trading generally involves a short investment
timeframe relative to that associated with portfolio trading.56 Investors
engaged in information trading might have much reason to load up on
an individual stock. But maintaining that investment position involves
taking on firm-specific risk beyond that which can be diversified away,57
51 E.g., HARRIS, supra note 18, at 6 (“[Informed] [t]raders . . . estimate fundamental
values [and] cause prices to reflect their value estimates.”).
52 See Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519,
519-20 (1945) (providing one of the seminal works on the role of markets in
incorporating far-ranging pieces of information into prices).
53 The two main social benefits of enhanced price accuracy are said to be more
efficient capital allocation and better corporate governance. For a seminal work on these
connections in the legal literature, see Merritt B. Fox, Shelf Registration, Integrated
Disclosure, and Underwriter Due Diligence: An Economic Analysis, 70 VA. L. REV. 1005,
1013-14 (1984). See also Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Cost of
“Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977, 979 (1992).
54 E.g., Goshen & Parchomovsky, Essential Role, supra note 5, at 764
(“[I]nformation traders will be able to generate the benefits associated with close analyst
coverage, such as efficient pricing . . . and better monitoring of agency costs.”); id. at
715 (asserting that the essential role of “securities regulation is . . . to facilitate and
protect the work of information traders”).
55 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
56 See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text (discussing the index approach to
investing); see also HARRIS, supra note 18, at 488 (comparing yearly turnover of active
and passive portfolio managers).
57 See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Equilibrium Short Horizons of Investors
and Firms, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 148, 149 (1990) (“Arbitrage, however, is often risky and
risk cannot be completely sold off in the market. If, for example, an asset is underpriced
relative to its fundamental value, and a smart investor buys it, he has to bear the risk
that before mispricing is eliminated or reduced the fundamental value actually falls. In
this case, his arbitrage trade results in a loss even though it was ex ante attractive. In
addition to fundamental risk, the smart investor bears the risk that the mispricing gets
worse before it is eliminated . . . .”); supra note 14 and accompanying text. Recent work
suggests that the costs of pursuing an information-based strategy are far larger than
many had previously thought. See Ian Ayres & Edward Fox, Alpha Duties: The Search
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among other notable costs.58 For these reasons, all else being equal,
information traders will want to exit that position sooner rather than
later.59 Indeed, even for mutual funds, turning over (i.e., changing) all
portfolio holdings within a single year is not uncommon.60 Moreover,
the average overall holding period for a public company stock has been
reported to be just a third of a year,61 something that also reflects the
for Excess Returns and Appropriate Fiduciary Duties, 97 TEX. L. REV. 445, 448-50 (2019).
More specifically, Professors Ayres and Fox note that those seeking an alpha return
“sacrifice some of the benefits of diversification, low fees, or appropriate risk.” Id. at
448. The authors then provide empirical support for the conclusion that “the required
offsetting alpha to justify diversification, exposure, and excess-fee losses are often
surprisingly large.” Id. at 515.
58 See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, The Noise Trader Approach to
Finance, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1990, at 19, 21 (1990) (“[T]here are several reasons that
it makes sense to assume that arbitrageurs have short horizons. Most importantly,
arbitrageurs have to borrow cash or securities to implement their trades, and as a result
must pay the lenders per period fees . . . . The structure of transaction costs thus induces
a strong bias toward short horizons . . . . In addition, the performance of most money
managers is evaluated at least once a year and usually once every few months, also
limiting the horizon of arbitrage. As a result of these problems, resources dedicated to
long-term arbitrage against fundamental mispricing are very scarce.”).
59 See, e.g., id.; Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 57, at 152-53 (arguing that short-term
arbitrage will be more common than long-term arbitrage due to the costs of holding
securities for longer periods for arbitrageurs).
60 E.g., JOHN C. BOGLE, COMMON SENSE ON MUTUAL FUNDS 380 (2010) (“Twenty-five
years ago, fund portfolio turnover averaged 30 percent annually; today, it averages nearly
90 percent.”); HARRIS, supra note 18, at 488 (“Active managers often have turnover rates of
more than 100 percent per year.”); NEW YORK STOCK EXCH., REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STOCK
EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 13 (2010) (“Annualized turnover of
stocks traded on the NYSE is now estimated to be over 100%, which means that on average
an NYSE-listed company experiences trading volume each year exceeding the total number
of its issued and outstanding shares.”); Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis,
and Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265, 295-96 (2012) (discussing the high turnover
rates of actively managed investment funds); Laura Bruce, Mutual Fund Turnover and Taxes,
MARKETWATCH (Mar. 11, 2002, 12:18 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/mutualfund-turnover-and-taxes (“William Harding, an analyst with Morningstar, says the average
turnover ratio for managed domestic stock funds is 130 percent. ‘Many managers claim to
be long-term investors when, in reality, the average mutual fund manager is turning the
portfolio more than once a year.’”); Stocks Traded, Turnover Ratio of Domestic Shares (%) United States, WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.TRNR?
locations=US&view=chart (last visited Aug. 30, 2019) (reporting an overall turnover rate
for U.S. domestic public stocks of well over 100% over the past 20-plus years). But see Anne
M. Tucker, The Long and the Short: Portfolio Turnover Ratios and Mutual Fund Investment
Time Horizons, 43 J. CORP. L. 581, 612 n.168, 627 (2018) (finding similar turnover rates for
active and passive mutual funds, and suggesting “closet indexing” by the “active” funds).
61 E.g., In re Morton’s Rest. Grp. S’holders Litig., 74 A.3d 656, 670 n.77 (Del. Ch.
2013) (summarizing several studies of modern equity turnover); Taking the Long View,
ECONOMIST (Nov. 24, 2012), https://www.economist.com/business/2012/11/24/takingthe-long-view (“[T]he average time that people hold a stock on the New York Stock
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short investment time horizon of these traders. Some of these numbers
must be viewed along with a more complete understanding of the
contemporary stock market.62 But their general content alone is
nonetheless striking and indicates the pervasiveness of active trading by
information traders today.63
C. Noise Trading
The third broad type of trading (noise trading) can be thought of as
information trading gone wrong. Noise trading involves buying and
selling based on what the trader believes is superior information, yet far
more often than not fails due to a flawed approach.64 The problem in
the approach is generally traceable to interpretations of information that
Exchange has tumbled from eight years in 1960 to four months in 2010.”); Jesse
Eisinger, Challenging the Long-Held Belief in ‘Shareholder Value’, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK
(June 27, 2012, 12:00 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/challenging-thelong-held-belief-in-shareholder-value (“The average holding period of a stock was eight
years in 1960; today, it’s four months.”).
62 A very large portion of stock trading goes through professional intermediaries.
See infra Part I.D (describing market making). Thus, a very large portion of sales of
shares from one “natural investor” (e.g., a retiree) to another such investor (e.g., a
retirement saver) are recorded as two trades. One trade takes place when the retiree
sells the shares to the intermediary, and another when that intermediary passes those
shares on to the retirement saving buyer. See id. Turnover rates reported by, for
example, exchanges thus may reflect some double counting of trades between actual
investors. In my research into stock turnover rates, I have not seen evidence of this
intermediation — and thus double counting — being considered. Nevertheless, even
when that intermediation is considered, these rates remain strikingly high. And while
this intermediation would increase turnover rates for trading on exchanges, it should
not increase turnover rates for individual funds. In short, even if what amounts, in
substance, to a transaction between a natural seller and a natural buyer on an exchange
may involve two trades in many cases, the turnover of shares by a mutual fund involves
just one.
63 In 2010, Chief Justice Strine of the Delaware Supreme Court published an essay
“highlight[ing] the underlying facts regarding how short a time most stockholders,
including institutional investors, hold their shares” and, alternatively stated, “rais[ing]
the basic facts regarding the short-term horizons of most equity owners . . . .” Leo E.
Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can Corporations
Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think LongTerm?, BUS. LAW., Nov. 2010, at 1-2. In the essay, he reviews a very large number of
sources to support his concern for the short duration of active investors. Those sources
report annual share turnover for actively managed mutual funds in the 100% range, and
hedge-fund turnover in the 300% range. See id. at 8-12. He also notes that “[o]ne
respected academic commentator suggests that even pension funds typically turn over
their portfolios in a year.” Id. at 10 (quotation marks omitted).
64 E.g., J. Bradford DeLong et al., Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets, 98 J. POL.
ECON. 703, 706-07 (1990); Fox et al., Informed Trading, supra note 43, at 831-32;
Shleifer & Summers, supra note 58, at 23.
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do not comport with consensus views over even their investment
horizon, such as a trade based on a development that has already been
priced into the stock.65 Noise traders have therefore long been denied
even categorization along with information traders, even though their
focus is — from at least their perspective — on using information to
earn trading profits.66
Like with portfolio trading and information trading, those behind
noise trading can be ordinary individuals. To get a sense of what is
perhaps the most common type of investor operating in this way, one
need only think of the day traders sitting at home during the internet
boom of the late 1990s, reading “Heard on the Street”-type columns and
submitting orders to trade from their laptops from the couch. But you
could also conjure up other images. Countless institutions no doubt
engage in the same basic behavior, albeit surrounded by larger screens
in fancier work spaces. But even when those engaged in noise trading
are ordinary individuals or investment funds using ordinary individuals’
capital, noise trading looks very different than buy-and-hold investing.
Given the nature of their trading motivations, noise traders likely
have an investment horizon that is loosely on par with that of
information traders described in the preceding section. But some no
doubt fail to even understand the basics of asset pricing,67 and therefore
stay in undiversified positions longer than the average savvy
information trader. Still, relative to the universe of buy-and-hold
ordinary investors described at the outset of this Part, these active
traders likely have short investment horizons.
D. Market Making
Unlike the three types of trading introduced thus far, the final broad
type, market making, does not aim to amass investment positions in
stock. Quite the opposite, this non-directional trading seeks to generate
income by supplying a specialized intermediation service for any trader
in the market68 — and targets little to no inventory of stock at the end
65 E.g., Fox et al., Informed Trading, supra note 43, at 831 (“Noise traders believe
they have information that permits a more accurate appraisal of an issuer’s value, but
that information either is already reflected in price or is irrelevant to developing a more
accurate appraisal.”); DeLong et al., supra note 64, at 706-07; J. Bradford DeLong,
Andrei Shleifer, Lawrence H. Summers & Robert J. Waldmann, The Size and Incidence
of the Losses from Noise Trading, 44 J. FIN. 681, 683 (1989).
66 E.g., Goshen & Parchomovsky, Essential Role, supra note 5, at 714-15 (treating
information traders and noise traders as distinct types of traders).
67 See supra notes 14 & 57 and accompanying text.
68 E.g., HARRIS, supra note 18, at 279 (referring to these traders simply as “dealers”).
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of each day.69 These professionals supply liquidity to other market
participants — specifically, to those that seek to transact on demand
rather than searching around for a true non-intermediary counterparty
or patiently waiting until such a counterparty comes their way.70 Today,
market makers often meet this demand with respect to every individual
stock in the market.71 They also now generally supply these services
relating to the trading of exchange-traded funds and other financial
instruments in that same market and abroad.72 And they generally do
all of this via computer-driven trading, rather than through individual
men in color-coded jackets standing on a trading floor.73
Unlike with portfolio, information, and noise trading, ordinary
investors — by definition — do not engage in professional market
making. Still, a more detailed description of market makers and how
they operate is crucial for understanding the extent to which the core
securities laws serve a significant investor-protection role post-IPO.
Market makers supply their services by quoting bid prices and ask
prices around stocks’ current market values.74 Their bid quotes
generally represent firm offers to buy stock.75 Bid prices are thus those
69 Walter Bagehot, The Only Game in Town, 27 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 12-14 (1971); Mark
B. Garman, Market Microstructure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 257 (1976); see also HARRIS, supra
note 18, at 283.
70 See HARRIS, supra note 18, at 278. Consistent with this description, many refer to
these traders today as “professional liquidity providers.”
71 See, e.g., Chris Concannon, Program on the Law and Economics of Capital Markets
Workshop: High-Frequency Trading, COLUMBIA LAW SCH. (Nov. 29, 2012), https://capitalmarkets.law.columbia.edu/events/high-frequency-trading [http://perma.cc/Y5RS-67NG]
(describing an electronic trading firm and market maker that trades equities across
exchanges and platforms).
72 E.g., Virtu Financial, Inc., Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of
1933 (Form S-1), at 1 (Mar. 10, 2014), http://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK0001592386/6f927b41-4dd3-4a2b-83d1-ff125d154b90.pdf (asserting that they provide
liquidity “in more than 10,000 securities and other financial instruments on more than
210 unique exchanges, markets and liquidity pools in 30 countries around the world”);
Customized Liquidity, VIRTU FINANCIAL, https://www.virtu.com/market-making/
customliq/veq/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2018) (“In equities, we provide access to liquidity
through a range of global stocks, ETPs and ADRs, including many difficult-to-trade
names.”).
73 Today, algorithms deployed by a handful of trading firms are thought to dominate
the business of market making. See Jonathan A. Brogaard et al., High Frequency Trading
and Price Discovery, 27 REV. FIN. STUD. 2267, 2271-78 (2014) (using a NASDAQ data
set to show that high-frequency traders supply liquidity for over half of all trades);
Albert J. Menkveld, High-Frequency Trading and the New Market Makers, 16 J. FIN.
MARKETS 712, 714 (2013).
74 See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 18, at 297.
75 When displayed on trading platforms, the law — not just industry practice —
ensures that the quotes are firm. See Dissemination of Quotations in NMS Securities,
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in return for which traders can sell stock on demand. Their ask quotes
likewise represent the prices at which they are prepared to sell in the
same fashion. Ask prices are thus those at which traders can buy stock
immediately with certainty. For example, assume the market currently
values a stock at $10.50 per share. If market makers were quoting
$10.49 best (highest) bid prices and $10.51 best (lowest) ask ones
around that value, then other traders could sell the stock to them by
accepting the $10.49 bid price, or buy it from them by paying the $10.51
ask price. In order to transact on demand against these prices, these
sellers thus must sell at a discount (they get only $10.49 per share for
this stock valued at $10.50), and these buyers must pay a premium
(they must pay $10.51 per share for the $10.50 stock).
Market makers post only a limited quantity of shares at their best
(highest) bid prices and best (lowest) ask ones. Beyond those “inside
spread”76 quotes, they then post a series of successively inferior ones.
So, they may quote a best bid of $10.49 and ask of $10.51 around a
market value of $10.50 for a stock, but they may only post 5,000 shares
at each. Beyond that, they might quote 5,000 additional shares at each
“tick” below the highest $10.49 bid price ($10.48, $10.47, $10.46, and
so on) and 5,000 additional shares at each tick above the lowest $10.51
ask price ($10.52, $10.53, $10.54, and so on). Those successively
inferior prices of course increase the discount large opposite-side
traders must accept to sell on demand, and increase the premium other
such traders must pay to buy on demand. In other words, the average
price per share they receive in return for stock will be lower than that
associated with the best (highest) bid price, and the average price per
share they pay in return for stock will be higher than that associated
with the best (lowest) ask price.
Market makers do not specialize in understanding the fundamental
values of the instruments they trade.77 Instead, their primary mission is
to nail down those instruments’ market values. As the nomenclature
suggests, they aim to find the value around which to place their quotes

Rule 602(b), 17 C.F.R. § 242.602(b)(2) (2017) (requiring displayed quotes to be legally
binding offers to trade).
76 The term “inside spread” is traceable to a vertical depiction of prices, where they
are set out with bids below a stock’s market value and asks above that value — meaning
that the best (highest) bid and best (lowest) ask surrounding the current market value
fall in the inside of the diagram once a slew of successively inferior bids and asks are
added to it.
77 E.g., HARRIS, supra note 18, at 277 (“[Market makers] tend to . . . not know much
about . . . the fundamental values of the instruments that they trade.”).
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so that a two-sided market of buyers and sellers arises.78 Doing so allows
them to profit by purchasing shares from the sellers at bid prices that
are below the ask prices for which they turn around and sell them to
the buyers — thereby earning their bid-ask spread. For example, the
market makers above would make two cents per share each time they
were able to buy shares at their bid prices of $10.49 opposite some
traders’ sell orders, and then sell those shares to other traders’ buy
orders at their slightly higher $10.51 ask prices. In an electronic stock
market where about 7 billion shares are transacted each day in U.S.
stocks alone,79 even bid-ask spreads far smaller than the one in this
example can produce considerable profits.
Importantly, stocks generally do not just have a single “market price.”
Instead, as the above description indicates, they have at least two: one
at which traders can buy them on demand (the ask price), and one in
return for which they can sell them in that manner (the bid price). And
those two market prices are generally distinct from the price that
represents a stock’s current market value. That current market value is,
as a general matter, simply halfway between the market prices.80
***
This initial Part provided a basic description of the four main types of
trading in the stock market today. Whether conducted “directly”
through brokerage accounts or indirectly through investment-fund
intermediaries, portfolio-, information-, and noise-trading investors
accumulate stock positions with an eye on financial gain. The highspeed-trading institutions that are in the business of making markets
with an aim of zero inventory at the end of each trading day are after
the same. But as this quick overview alone makes clear, the motivations
and strategies inherent in each of these four types of trading vary
greatly. An understanding of the differences along these lines
emphasized above provides much of the background for the remainder
of this Article.

78 E.g., id. at 401 (“Market makers simply try to discover the prices that produce
balanced two-sided order flows.”); see also supra note 69 and accompanying text.
79 U.S. Equities Market Volume Summary, CBOE, http://www.bats.com/us/equities/
market_share [http://perma.cc/4PWJ-99UJ] (providing the daily trading volume across
the market); see also supra note 72.
80 See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 18, at 287-88 (“[Market makers aim to] . . . set their
bid prices just below fundamental values and their ask prices just above”).
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II. HOW INFORMATION ASYMMETRY AFFECTS BUY-AND-HOLD
ORDINARY INVESTORS AND THE LARGER UNIVERSE OF ORDINARY
INVESTORS
The relevant discord between investor-protection advocates and the
law and economics orthodoxy is clear.81 But neither side has provided a
close enough look at how stock market information asymmetry actually
affects ordinary investors. This Part therefore focuses on interactions of
the traders introduced in the previous one to explain how information
asymmetry in the stock market manifests itself in the form of a specific
type of illiquidity.82 At first glance, the ordinary investor impact of these
dynamics may seem simple: all ordinary investors get burned by
information asymmetry due to reduced liquidity. But as detailed in this
Part, it is well-established that markets discount the value of financial
assets when they exhibit this type of illiquidity. These discounts, I
argue, affect different ordinary investors in different ways, more or less
preserving the expected return for some, but providing too little
compensation to others and too much to yet others. I thus theorize
below that while the reductions to information asymmetry provided by
the core securities laws provide meaningful protection for some
ordinary investors, they impose a long-overlooked cost on many others.
In so doing, I explain why buy-and-hold ordinary investors likely suffer
from this cost and consider the extent to which that suffering might be
negated by any other benefits of the reductions. I then expand on that
thinking to consider what this all means for ordinary investors as a
whole.
A. The Relevant Illiquidity
Information asymmetry in the stock market manifests itself in a
specific type of illiquidity. The starting point for understanding this
illiquidity is found in interactions between information traders and
market makers.

81

See supra notes 4–17 and accompanying text.
A broader set of information asymmetry concerns for investors can also be
identified — namely, those relating to fairness and perceptions of fairness. An even
broader set of concerns for society no doubt exists as well, including those for confidence
in the market. I discuss the fairness and perceptions-of-fairness concerns in Part III.A
below. In my related broader work, I discuss all of these concerns in more detail. See
Haeberle, Information-Asymmetry Story, supra note 19.
82
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Market makers are generally at an informational disadvantage when
savvy information traders transact opposite their quotes.83 The latter
generally specialize in spotting market prices that fail to reflect better
understandings of fundamental values.84 All the while, the former are
channeling most of their energy to hone in on the market values and
prices that allow them to earn their spread.85 The problem that often
comes to fruition for these lesser-informed traders is thus one of getting
stuck having bought a stock for their market-making inventory from
information traders that was overvalued, or having sold one from that
inventory to those traders that was undervalued.86 Either way, they
suffer direct trading losses traceable to information asymmetry.87 These
losses to which this information asymmetry problem leads are
considerable.88
Market makers respond to the prospect of these losses in two ways:
by increasing the size of their bid-ask spreads and by increasing the
sensitivity of their price adjustment triggers. Each response protects the
market makers from information asymmetry, yet reduces liquidity in
the market. After all, larger spreads mean larger spread costs, and more
sensitive price adjustment triggers mean larger market-movement costs.
In this way, successful market makers pass on the costs of information
asymmetry to other traders — and therefore investors.
A brief overview of these costs and dynamics should suffice for
present purposes.89 With respect to spread costs, the more precise
83 For the seminal microstructure work modelling the discrepancy in knowledge
between informed traders and market makers, and the adverse selection costs associated
with it, see Lawrence R. Glosten & Paul R. Milgrom, Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in
a Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 71, 79
(1985).
84 Supra Part I.B.
85 Supra Part I.D.
86 See Glosten & Milgrom, supra note 83, at 78.
87 See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 18, at 299 (“[I]nformed traders choose the side of the
market on which they trade, and the dealers end up losing money to them.”); see also
Glosten & Milgrom, supra note 83, at 79.
88 See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 18, at 303 (“[I]n most markets the adverse selection
spread component accounts for more of the total spread than does the transaction cost
spread component.”); id. at 297 (noting that market maker fortunes depend on, among
other things, “how much they lose to informed traders”).
89 The spread and market-movement costs summarized here are well-known to the
economists who study the stock market and the professionals that inhabit it. References
to the former costs have also become increasingly present in the legal literature on
securities law over time. See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading: Hayek, Virtual
Markets, and the Dog That Did Not Bark, 31 J. CORP. L. 167, 168 (2005) (noting that
these costs represent an “insider trading tax” for non-insider investors); see also infra
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market maker response is to post inferior quotes at both inside quotes
and the ticks surrounding them. That is, there is an increase in the size
of the spread between market makers’ best (highest) bid quotes and best
(lowest) ask quotes as well as a decrease in the number of shares quoted
at them and/or each successively inferior price quote.90 Whether viewed
as a spread cost or as one associated with inferior pricing, the key point
is that the premium on top of the current market value that traders
buying opposite liquidity provider ask prices must pay is larger when
information asymmetry is heightened. The same goes for the discount
off that market value that those selling against liquidity provider bid
prices must accept.91
The market-movement costs can be similarly summarized. Market
makers adjust their estimates of value and corresponding prices in
response to net buying or selling activity in the market.92 For this
reason, those transacting opposite their quotes in large enough quantity
cause market movements that drive up their purchase prices when
buying, and push down their sale prices when selling. Their own trading
thus causes market prices to move up (down) over the short run,
thereby resulting in the traders behind it paying (receiving) an average
price that is higher (lower) than that dictated by the fundamental value
information known by the market at the time. Their trading is thus said
to have a “price impact,” or to “leave a footprint.”93 Because the price
impact/footprint causes prices to move in the opposite direction of their
short-term trading interest before they can complete that trading, they

note 182. Nevertheless, description of the latter is for the most part missing from that
literature. In my related work on the stock market information asymmetry and its
regulation from a social perspective, see supra note 19, I look more closely at each of
these costs.
90 See generally supra Part I.D (describing these aspects of market-maker quotes).
91 The total size of the spread (and therefore these costs) is also a product of other
forces — namely, those that impose other costs on market makers. See, e.g., Ananth
Madhavan, Market Microstructure: A Survey, 3 J. FIN. MARKETS 205, 242-43 (2000). The
main other cost incurred by these professionals relates to the inventory risk associated
with holding assets with values that can vary widely. See id. at 223; supra note 69 and
accompanying text. Nevertheless, information asymmetry is generally the largest driver
of spread sizes (and hence spread costs). See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
92 See Glosten & Milgrom, supra note 83, at 87; id. at 91 (stating that when a market
maker experiences unexpectedly high trading volume due to informed trading, “he will
revise upward his estimate of the probability of an insider arrival and increase the spread
accordingly”).
93 RISHI K. NARANG, INSIDE THE BLACK BOX: A SIMPLE GUIDE TO QUANTITATIVE AND
HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING 119-20 (2d ed. 2013) (discussing “market impact” and the
concept of “leaving a footprint” in this context).
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are said to suffer a cost. The cost comes in the form of an average price
tag per share that is higher than it would otherwise be.
Because this cost is traceable to the market maker concern for having
their quotes adversely selected by better-informed traders, it too is
rooted in information asymmetry. When market makers expect
heightened asymmetry, the threshold that triggers these movements
will be lower — meaning that market-movement costs for those buying
and selling opposite them will be higher.94 When those professional
intermediaries sense a reduction in information asymmetry in the
coming period, the opposite is true.95 All of these behaviors are
exacerbated by the fact that trading in the market is largely anonymous,
meaning that even the purchases and sales of portfolio-trading ordinary
investors can have this price impact despite their extra-informational
nature — and thus can trigger this second type of information
asymmetry cost.
Lastly, it is important to note that this specific type of illiquidity that
comes in the form of the spread and market-movement costs
summarized above can be harmful even when those costs are not
directly incurred. I therefore include a third category in this discussion
of that illiquidity, and label it “avoidance costs.” This final aspect of the
illiquidity imposes costs on investors when they seek to avoid one or
both of the costs detailed above. This avoidance can have two main
negative effects on investors. The first involves lost utility from not
trading. In short, expected spread and/or market-movement costs can
result in a trader opting to sit out the game.96 To the extent this
forbearance results in an investor missing out on what would otherwise
be a utility-enhancing portfolio adjustment, profitable investment
opportunity, or the like, it represents a cost. The second avoidance cost
involves the allocation of resources toward trading at a lower spread
and/or market movement cost. This cost is thus incurred when the
investor has avoided spread and market-movement costs not by
omitting to trade, but instead by throwing money or other resources at

94 See Glosten & Milgrom, supra note 83. For empirical evidence supporting this
point, see Easley et al., Time-Varying Arrival Rates of Informed and Uninformed Traders,
6 J. FIN. ECONOMETRICS 171, 196 fig.4 (2008) (showing the price impact of individual
trades in the same stock in different informational environments).
95 See Glosten & Milgrom, supra note 83; Easely et al., supra note 94, at 196 fig.4.
96 See, e.g., George M. Constantinides, Capital Market Equilibrium with Transaction
Costs, 94 J. POL. ECON. 842, 859 (1986) (“[I]nvestors accommodate transaction costs by
drastically reducing the frequency and volume of trade.”).
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the problem — for example, by engaging in a burdensome search for
counterparties who are willing to transact at better prices.97
B. Market Discounts for the Illiquidity
Markets have a way of dealing with the expected costs associated with
the thing being bought or sold: they discount the value of that thing.
The most prominent example of this dynamic is found in asset pricing
models for stocks, which center on discounts for the market-wide risk
and opportunity costs inherent in stock investment.98 Rights to
expected future cash flows (e.g., $100 in one year) are therefore
purchased at a lower dollar amount today (e.g., $93).
Stocks’ market prices will be discounted due to other considerations
as well.99 The robust literature on securities disclosure law provides a
prominent example of this principle in its examination of the quality of
corporate disclosure.100 All else being equal, the less that is known about
an issuer, the larger the risk involved with holding its securities. So this
discount makes sense as a matter of basic finance.101
Along these same lines, there are also related discounts due to
illiquidity in the secondary market. The existence of these discounts is

97 Some might think that ordinary investors incur information asymmetry costs in
ways beyond those in focus above, namely by trading directly opposite better-informed
traders without market-maker intermediation. Although this Article challenges the
status quo on information asymmetry and ordinary investors, it does not challenge the
conventional law and economics idea that, on an expected basis, ordinary investors
engaging in portfolio trading suffer no harm when they transact directly opposite betterinformed traders, or when they transact elsewhere in the market at the same time as
better-informed traders. See, e.g., Manne, Defense, supra note 5, at 115; see also sources
cited supra note 17. In my contemporaneous work, I think more about this direct
trading situation for various types of investors. See Haeberle, Information-Asymmetry
Story, supra note 19.
98 See, e.g., BREALEY ET AL., supra note 14, at 24-25; Sharpe, supra note 25, at 425-42.
99 E.g., Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the
International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 925 (1997) (“In
addition to the incorporation of information about macroeconomic conditions, industry
conditions, firm management, firm capital structure, and many other factors, the market
will take into account the value of the securities laws . . . . [I]f the laws provide
opportunity for managers to extract value from the firm, this will be reflected in lower
prices for the traded securities.”).
100 E.g., Fox et al., Share Price Accuracy, supra note 13, at 336 n.13 (noting the “broad
consensus that the effect of . . . future disclosure practices [by an issuer] on the expected
future cash flow to holders of the issuer’s shares is reflected in the price”).
101 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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the subject of a foundational microstructure article102 and the literature
built on it.103 The core point of the works in this area is that “[i]nvestors
require a higher expected return from an asset with lower liquidity to
compensate for its higher trading costs.”104 Simply put, the market
discounts the value of illiquid stocks.105
Illiquidity discounts can be material to stock pricing. This point is
one of the central ones of the foundational Amihud and Mendelson
article.106 These costs matter because they will generally be incurred

102 Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, Asset Pricing and the Bid-Ask Spread, 17 J.
FIN. ECON. 223 (1986) [hereinafter Asset Pricing]. The premise also has been at least
roughly acknowledged in the legal literature dating back to even before the Amihud and
Mendelson article. See Easterbrook, Insider Trading, supra note 9, at 325 (published in
1981). Professor Fox and I also acknowledged these discounts in 2017. See Merritt B.
Fox & Kevin S. Haeberle, Evaluating Stock-Trading Practices and Their Regulation, 42 J.
CORP. L. 887, 906 (2017) (“[T]he prospect of greater liquidity results in the issuer’s
expected future cash flows being discounted to present value at a lower discount rate.”).
103 Professors Amihud and Mendelson, joined by Professor Lasse Heje Pedersen,
survey this literature in YAKOV AMIHUD ET AL., MARKET LIQUIDITY: ASSET PRICING, RISK,
AND CRISES (2013) [hereinafter MARKET LIQUIDITY].
104 Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, Liquidity and Asset Prices: Financial
Management Implications, 17 FIN. MGMT. 5, 6 (1988) [hereinafter Liquidity]; see also id.
(“Investors . . . require a compensation from the trading costs they bear. Thus, asset
prices should reflect their liquidity characteristics.”).
105 E.g., AMIHUD ET AL., MARKET LIQUIDITY, supra note 103, at 1 (“If two assets
generate the same cash flows over time but one of them is less liquid (has higher trading
costs), rational investors will pay less for the less liquid asset, which costs more to
trade.”).
106 See Amihud & Mendelson, Asset Pricing, supra note 102, at 224 (“This study
highlights the importance of securities market microstructure in determining asset
returns, and provides a link between this area and mainstream research on capital
markets.”). The subsequent literature on asset pricing and liquidity further supports
this conclusion. See, e.g., BODIE ET AL., supra note 36, at 313 (“[T]he liquidity premium
that emerges from these studies [following the seminal Amihud and Mendelson article]
appears to be of roughly the same order of magnitude as the market risk premium,
suggesting that liquidity should be a first-order consideration when thinking about
security pricing.”). But see Constantinides, supra note 96, at 847 (concluding that
“transactions costs have only a second-order effect on the liquidity premium of an
asset’s rate of return”); id. at 859 (“[A]n investor’s expected utility is insensitive to
deviations from the optimal portfolio proportions. Hence the liquidity premium due to
transaction costs is small.”). Notably, the Constantinides (1986) conclusion on the
magnitude of the discount is inconsistent with the literature that has since emerged, as
indicated by the second source above. See also AMIHUD ET AL., MARKET LIQUIDITY, supra
note 103. However, the extent to which the literature maintains that liquidity costs
alone (as opposed to the cost associated with the risk of liquidity costs changing in the
future (“liquidity risk”)) are of first-order importance is unclear.
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each time the security changes hands,107 and securities change hands
quite often.108
The literature on liquidity and asset pricing focuses on just that, and
not just information-asymmetry-based illiquidity. But its central
premises summarized here nevertheless apply to the latter. Informationasymmetry-based illiquidity in the market (i.e., that embodied in spread
and market-movement costs) is nothing more than a type of
illiquidity.109 Indeed, information asymmetry is generally the leading
driver of spread and market-movement costs in the market today.110
To be sure, some buyers will purchase their shares without paying
spread or market-movement costs. That is generally true of, for
example, buyers who purchase shares, directly or indirectly, from an
issuer in an IPO.111 But the costs matter for even these buyers, as they
still face the prospect of illiquidity when selling down the road.112 Of
course, one who purchases a stock from an issuer in an IPO and then
holds it throughout the entire life of the firm (perhaps collecting
dividends along the way) would not be directly harmed by illiquidity in
the secondary market. But most investors do not purchase shares in the
primary market (or even the secondary one) to hold them in that way.113
Thus, due to the presence of asymmetrically-informed market
participants and the spread and market-movement costs to which that
presence gives rise, the market price for stock is affected negatively (i.e.,
discounted) from IPO forward. And this discount of course has the
107 See Amihud & Mendelson, Liquidity, supra note 104, at 6 (noting “the
significance of trading costs when their recurring nature is taken into account”); id.
(“[T]hese costs will be incurred repeatedly whenever the asset is traded.”).
108 See, e.g., supra notes 56, 60–61 and accompanying text (discussing current share
turnover rates and average holding periods).
109 See supra Part II.A.
110 See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text.
111 Buyers can sometimes escape these costs in the secondary market in other ways
as well. See Haeberle, Information-Asymmetry Story, supra note 19 (discussing market
mechanisms that allow such avoidance).
112 E.g., Ayres, supra note 20, at 977 (“As long as there is a positive probability that
investors will need to sell their shares while the market is illiquid, the stock price will
be discounted.”). The uncertain nature of that probability and the amount of future
illiquidity present added costs for investors. See, e.g., AMIHUD ET AL., MARKET LIQUIDITY,
supra note 103, at 101-84 (providing an overview of the economics literature on
“liquidity risk”).
113 See, e.g., Katrina Ellis, Who Trades IPOs? A Close Look at the First Days of Trading,
79 J. FIN. ECON. 339, 344-45 (2006) (finding a 76% mean turnover rate of IPO shares
in just the first two days of trading); see also supra note 61 and accompanying text
(discussing typically annual turnover by both portfolio traders and information
traders).
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power to greatly alter the extent to which investors are harmed by
information asymmetry.
C. The Effect of the Discounts on Buy-and-Hold Ordinary Investors and
the Larger Universe of Ordinary Investors
The natural inference from the conclusions of the preceding section
is that all investors, as a general matter, are able to negate the impact of
information asymmetry on their investment return thanks to the
relevant discounts. This appears to be the reigning assumption among
those who have considered the effects of market discounts more
generally on ordinary investors.114 But the assumption does not reflect
important nuance — and overlooks the likely significant benefit of
information asymmetry on the margin for at least buy-and-hold
ordinary investors.
The more precise effect of illiquidity discounts on ordinary investors,
I theorize, turns on ordinary investors’ investment horizon relative to
that of the marginal investor. All else being equal, on an expected basis,
the negative impact of spread and market-movement costs that will be
incurred by an investor turns on the length of his investment holding
period.115 The longer the holding period, the better these costs can be
amortized, and therefore the less the investor must discount to negate
them.116 The shorter that period, the opposite is true.117
Professors Amihud, Mendelson, and Pedersen illustrate this dynamic
in their book with the following example, which I alter for additional
clarity:

114 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. The recent Informed Trading and Its
Regulation article published by colleagues with whom I have worked closely appears to
make this assumption, albeit in the context of a far broader discussion. See Fox et al.,
Informed Trading, supra note 43, at 841 (“Freely occurring fundamental value informed
trading does widen the spread that uniformed traders need to pay. However, this
widened spread . . . neither helps nor hurts uninformed traders on average because
share prices are commensurately discounted to reflect this widened spread.”).
115 See Amihud & Mendelson, Asset Pricing, supra note 102, at 228 (stating that
“transaction costs are amortized over the investor’s holding period”).
116 See id. at 231 (concluding that “longer investment horizon mitigates the burden
of transaction costs by enabling their amortization over a longer holding period”); id. at
228-29 (“The longer [the investor’s holding] period, the smaller the compensation
required for a given increase in spread.”); Amihud & Mendelson, Liquidity, supra note
104, at 6-7 (noting that the cost of illiquidity is lower for investors with longer holding
periods).
117 See Amihud & Mendelson, Asset Pricing, supra note 102, at 228-29, 231; Amihud
& Mendelson, Liquidity, supra note 104, at 6-7.
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Consider, for example, an asset that pays out a riskless annual
dividend of $4 in perpetuity and suppose the risk-free annual
rate is 4%. Absent trading costs, the asset price is $100.
However, if the asset incurs a trading cost of $0.50 (0.5% of its
value) [each time it is traded] and is traded once a year, the cash
flow stream associated with the trading costs has a net present
value of $12.5 of the asset’s value, meaning that the price of the
asset drops to $100 – $12.5 = $87.5. Said differently, while a
transaction cost of 0.5% is a small fraction of the asset’s [initial
$100] value, it should really be compared to the 4% [($4.00)]
dividend yield, because both dividends and transaction costs are
“flows” that are incurred repeatedly. Since the transaction cost
[($0.50)] is one-eighth [(12.5%)] of the dividend yield
[($4.00)], [the cost’s] present value is one-eighth [($12.50)] of
the present value of [the asset’s] dividends [($100)]
($12.5/$100 = 1/8). Furthermore, if the asset is traded every
half-year, then after accounting for transaction costs, the asset’s
value will be about $75, a discount of $25 [because the annual
transaction fees incurred ($0.50 x 2) take away $1 (or 25%) of
the $4 expected return [of the asset — thereby requiring a
discount of $25 on the $100 transaction-cost-free price of the
future cash flow right represented by the asset.]118
It follows that the scope of the prevailing discount for informationasymmetry-based illiquidity will depend on the investment horizon of
the marginal investors who determine the equilibrium price of stocks.119
If those investors turn over their investments more rapidly, then they
will feel the costs of information asymmetry more acutely — and
discount prices more aggressively. In order to obtain the expected
return they require to make the investment attractive for that period,
they will require a larger discount. If they hold their positions for
longer, the opposite will be true.120
118

AMIHUD ET AL., MARKET LIQUIDITY, supra note 103, at 3-4.
See supra note 21.
120 AMIHUD ET AL., MARKET LIQUIDITY, supra note 103, at 10 (“Long-term investors
can effectively depreciate their trading costs over a longer holding period, and thus
require a smaller compensation in terms of per-period additional return than short-term
investors.”). Indeed, due to this added return that is available, a liquidity clientele effect
will result in longer-term investors opting into stocks with more illiquidity. See id. at 4
(“Higher trading costs can be better borne by long-term investors who trade less
frequently and, therefore, can depreciate them over a longer investment horizon.”). This
will decrease the premium that is available to long-term investors. See id. (“[W]hile
expected return is an increasing function of trading costs, it should be concave
119

176

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 53:145

Ordinary investors will either have an investment horizon that is
shorter than, equal to, or longer than that of these price setters. Roughly
speaking, some ordinary investors will therefore, respectively, be hurt
by information asymmetry, some left unaffected by it, and others will
benefit from it.121 On one end of the spectrum are ordinary investors
pursuing information trading and noise trading approaches. These
investors have relatively short investment horizons.122 On the other end
are those buy-and-hold ordinary investors who index the market as a
whole, and who thus generally have long investment horizons.123 But
who are the marginal investors who set the size of the discount?
The identity of the marginal investor has long eluded market
observers.124 But the remarkably short duration of average holding
periods reported today and related turnover data suggests that this
unobservable investor pursues an active investment strategy,125 whether
traceable to an information or noise approach (or even an active
portfolio one that does more than merely invest in an index of the entire
market or some broad part thereof).126 If this is true, then it is the impact
of information asymmetry costs on active investors’ expected return that
determines the relevant discount. If, due to information asymmetry
costs associated with a stock’s purchase and sale, these investors value
the stock at, e.g., $75/share rather than the $100 price that they would
pay absent illiquidity, then they will only be willing to buy the stock up
until the point at which its market price is $75.
Strikingly, to the extent the marginal investor pursues an active
information or noise strategy, her investment horizon is dramatically
shorter than that of buy-and-hold ordinary investors — and indeed
portfolio-trading ordinary investors as a whole.127 It follows that
(increasing at a decreasing rate), reflecting the mitigating effect of long-term holding
periods on the sensitivity of return to transaction costs.”).
121 Those who benefit from information asymmetry are better off not just because
they will be able to purchase a given dividend stream at a lower price, but also because
they can obtain capital appreciation at a lower price. In other words, all else being equal,
the longer-term investor would benefit even if the directors retained earnings in the
firm rather than distributing them to shareholders via dividends.
122 See supra Parts I.B, I.C.
123 See supra Parts I.A. Those pursuing more active portfolio trading than mere buyand-hold indexing also have relatively long horizons, albeit to a lesser degree. See supra
Part I.A.
124 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
125 See supra notes 56–63 and accompanying text (describing average holding
periods of just four months, the closely related high turnover rates, and related reasons
to believe that active investing involves short holding periods).
126 See supra Parts I.B, I.C, I.A, respectively.
127 See supra Parts I.A, I.B.
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information asymmetry on at least the margin provides more of the very
thing these investors target by investing: expected return. Accordingly,
the reductions in information asymmetry provided by the core disclosure,
fraud, and insider trading rules appear to be an unattractive feature of
the law for at least buy-and-hold ordinary investors (qua investors).
Of course, there are costs that might have come along with those
investors’ longer holding periods.128 The main one is that the investors
might have refrained from changes to their investment portfolio that
would otherwise have brought them utility.129 To in fact be worse off
due to the relevant reductions in information asymmetry, the lostreturn cost the investors incur would have to outweigh whatever gain
the reductions provide them in terms of utility from less trade
forbearance. But for at least those buy-and-hold investors who, even
with more liquid trading, would not be making changes to their
portfolio during their investment period, there is no such loss in utility.
And most buy-and-hold ordinary investors likely suffer little from
information-asymmetry-based trade forbearance. For one thing, the
market index in which they invest rebalances itself, thereby reducing
the utility that can be gained from more frequent trading.130 For
another, these investors’ risk preferences generally should not be
changing in a way that calls for significant trading each year, let alone
in less than the average holding period that is said to exist today (four
months131). Moreover, empirical research suggests that the scope of the
utility reduction is small for even those buy-and-hold investors and
more active portfolio traders who, all else being equal, would prefer to
make such changes over time, yet omit to because of the relevant
costs.132
Do the other types of avoidance costs change this thinking?
Quantifying the costs of the game in which investors try to transact
opposite each other without incurring the full spread and marketmovement costs present in the best displayed quotes in the market133 is
far beyond the scope of this Article. But any argument that buy-andhold ordinary investors’ share of those costs changes the above thinking
in a way that results in the lost return from the relevant reductions in
information asymmetry being dominated by saved avoidance costs
128

See supra Part II.A; supra note 98.
See supra Part II.A.
130 See supra Part I.A.
131 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
132 See Constantinides, supra note 96, at 859 (finding that “an investor’s expected
utility is insensitive to deviations from the optimal portfolio proportions”).
133 See supra Part II.A (describing these costs).
129
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would require, at a minimum, a look at costs that — to my knowledge
— have never even triggered serious investor-protection concern. These
insights therefore present a challenge to the idea that the reductions to
information asymmetry provided by the core securities laws are even a
neutral proposition for these investors (qua investors). That these
ordinary individuals are trading in line with the consensus ordinaryinvestor approach encouraged by the SEC and social science134 makes
the challenge one that applies to conventional thinking on information
asymmetry and investor protection more generally.
Still, a larger question remains: What does the identification of this
long-overlooked cost of the reductions in information asymmetry
provided by the core securities laws mean for the larger universe of
ordinary investors? Those reductions are also, I argue, disconcerting
from the perspective of these investors (as investors). This is because
134 E.g., MALKIEL, supra note 13, at 266-67 (“Because active management generally fails
to provide excess returns and also tends to generate greater tax burdens for investors as
they regularly realize capital gains, the advantage of passive management holds with even
greater force.”); id. at 407 (“The indexing strategy is the one I most highly recommend.”);
Ayres & Fox, supra note 57, at 453 (“[T]he consensus among economists and financial
professionals is surprisingly straightforward: Absent an alpha opportunity, one should
hold a portfolio which is (1) well-diversified, (2) low-cost, and (3) exposes you to ageappropriate stock market risk.”); Chester S. Spatt, Chief Economist and Dir., U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n, Address to the Pennsylvania Association of Public Employee Retirement
Systems Forum: Public Plan Investment and the Role of Indexing (Apr. 12, 2007),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch041207css.htm (stating that, as a result of the
many advantages of passive investing, the author “tend[s] to advocate personally the use
of low-cost passive and index investment products” and that “[f]or uninformed investors
low-cost passive strategies are very sensible given the competition within the marketplace
and efficiency of the capital market”); Kathleen Elkins, Jack Bogle Taught a Generation
How to Invest for the Long Term — This Was His Strategy, CNBC, (Jan. 17, 2019, 12:02
PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/17/jack-bogle-taught-a-generation-how-to-investfor-the-long-term-this-was-his-strategy.html (“‘[T]he simplest and most efficient
investment strategy is to buy and hold all of the nation’s publicly held businesses at very
low cost.’” (quoting Jack Bogle)); Risk and Return, INVESTOR.GOV, https://www.investor.
gov/additional-resources/specialized-resources/youth/teachers-classroom-resources/riskreturn (last visited Oct. 12, 2019) (“[I]nvestors who’ve adopted a ‘buy and hold’ approach
to investing tend to come out ahead of those who try to time the market.”); Lori Schock,
Women Can Level the Playing Field in Investing, INVESTOR.GOV, https://www.investor.gov/
additional-resources/specialized-resources/directors-take/women-can-level-playing-fieldinvesting (last visited Oct. 12, 2019) (“Women tend to buy and hold onto their
investments, while research shows that men tend to try to time the market and trade more
frequently. In fact, the investing approach used by many women is a good way to plan for
the long-term.”). In addition to the aforementioned sources on the consensus of the SEC
and social science, the judges of the chief corporate law tribunal in the United States have
also supported this thinking. E.g., Strine, supra note 63, at 12 (stating that “[m]any of the
wisest end-user investors do choose investment funds that do not churn: index funds,”
and discussing the social science backing this view).
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the reductions likely result in an investment-return wash for the
ordinary investors that pursue a trading strategy that is as active as the
price setters, a benefit to those who are even more active, yet a harm to
the vast portion that trades in and out of stock positions less frequently.
More precisely, which ordinary investors are as active as the price
setters, which are even more active, and which are more passive? The
answer depends on the type of trading pursued by the majority of
ordinary investors and, like above, the identity of the price setters. If the
price setters are investors who follow an information or noise approach,
then the full universe of passive ordinary investors faces the ordinaryinvestor cost identified in this Article. To the extent the majority of
ordinary investors follow a passive approach, a challenge along the same
lines as that made above then can be made, albeit with respect to
ordinary investors as a whole. But if the price setters are portfolio
traders who pursue a more active rebalancing approach,135 then it is
only the more passive ordinary investors (namely, buy-and-hold ones)
who are worse off in terms of investment return. All the while, ordinary
investors that engage in an even more active approach (whether
through information, noise, or portfolio trading) are in fact better off in
terms of investment return thanks to the reductions in information
asymmetry.
How this all nets out for ordinary investors as a whole when the laws’
effects on the additional costs of stock-market information asymmetry
(i.e., the avoidance costs136) are factored in, I cannot say. In short, the
picture here is less discernable than that drawn earlier in this Section
with respect to the reductions in information asymmetry provided by
the core laws and buy-and-hold ordinary investors. Without more
precise data on holding periods tied to specific investors trading in
specific types of ways, conclusions for ordinary investors as a whole are
tough to state with confidence. However, three clear conclusions have
already been drawn, and a fourth can now be stated. The first such
conclusion was that the reductions in information asymmetry likely
impose an investment-return harm on buy-and-hold ordinary investors.
The second was that this harm must be weighed against only limited
135 See supra notes 36, 41–42 and accompanying text. With the massive shift from
active to passive management over the past decade or two, it is possible that the
marginal investor is more passive than active. See, e.g., Asjylyn Loder, Do Passive
Investors Move Markets? They Can, WALL ST. J. (July 18, 2018, 4:37 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/etfs-unlikely-to-cause-widespread-market-disruptionsresearch-shows-1531906200 (“Assets in passive funds that try to match the market
rather than beat it have quintupled in the past decade to $6.9 trillion, according to
research firm Morningstar.”).
136 See supra Part II.A (describing these costs).
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gains from those same reductions for these investors. The third was that
the fact that these investors are pursuing the precise investment strategy
encouraged by the SEC and social science rendered these first two
effects, when taken together, disconcerting from an investor-protection
perspective. And the fourth conclusion I add here is that the closely
related effects on ordinary investors as a whole are also disconcerting
from an investor-protection perspective.
Lastly, it is worth emphasizing two final points. First, if the marginal
investor is a buy-and-hold one, then the relevant reductions in
information asymmetry are simply investment-return neutral for buyand-hold ordinary investors. After all, if this is the case, the costs of the
relevant illiquidity for these investors would likely be fully reflected in
the market discount — and thus the price of the stock.
Second, the precise scope of both the ordinary investor costs and
benefits sketched out above based on the well-founded assumption of a
more active marginal investor remains unknown beyond the broad
disconcerting contours drawn here.137 Indeed, the scope of the likely
investment return harm to buy-and-hold ordinary investors attributable
to the relevant reductions turns on a set of empirical questions identified
for the first time here. As explained in this Section, that scope centers on
the investment timeframe of the marginal investor relative to the investor
group at issue. Likewise, the scope of the trade-avoidance costs turns on
(1) the amount of the utility loss suffered by the members of the group
who refrain from trading due to the relevant illiquidity (if any), and
(2) the costs associated with seeking to trade at lower spread and/or
market-movement costs incurred by the same (if any).
***
This Part has provided long-overlooked nuance on the relationship
between the core securities laws that reduce information asymmetry in
137 Interestingly, even with respect to those information trading ordinary investors
for whom the relevant costs are a wash, information asymmetry more generally might
be net positive. After all, information asymmetry is the key to information trading
success. See supra Part I.B. Indeed, one can even question whether the relevant spread
and market-movement costs are properly classified as costs for information-trading
investors. If these traders truly have better information than the market, then the ask
prices they pay above and beyond the then-current market value of the stock can be
viewed as prices that are closer to the true value of the stock. The same basic principle
applies with respect to market movement “costs” for these traders: as they accumulate
larger positions that they have reason to believe are underpriced, they pay prices that
are closer to the true value. Whatever the appropriate characterization of these “costs”
for these traders, the brief overview of them in Part II.A makes clear that they are in fact
costs for at least portfolio traders — and therefore the vast majority of buy-and-hold
ordinary investors.
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the stock market and ordinary investor wellbeing. As explained above,
market makers incur losses to better-informed traders while operating
vulnerably on the front lines of the market. In response to the
expectation of those losses, they make changes that result in other
traders — and therefore investors — incurring information asymmetry
costs in two main forms, one relating to spreads and the other to market
movements. Any comprehensive discussion of the ordinary investor
effects of the core laws that limit informational unevenness among
market participants should thus include consideration of how traders
are affected by each of these costs, as well as the related costs that are
sometimes incurred to avoid them.
This Part began such a discussion. In particular, it built on, among
more basic aspects of economic theory, well-established principles
arising out of a foundational work that bridged principles of
microstructure with those of mainstream finance. In so doing, it
explained how investors discount the amount they will pay for stock to
reflect the prospect of illiquidity, thereby erasing costs of information
asymmetry from investment returns. But the extent to which the
prevailing discount performs that function for any group of investors
turns on the investment horizon of those investors in relation to the
same of those who determine the discount. Consequently, the relevant
reductions in information asymmetry, I theorized, will improve the
investment return of some portion of the ordinary investor universe, be
a wash for that of another, and harm that of the one that remains. The
extent to which one of these three dynamics dominates is an empirical
question first identified above that turns on the holding period of the
marginal investor relative to that of the group of ordinary investors at
issue (including the group of “all ordinary investors”). Building on yet
additional economic theory, this Part also viewed this newly identified
cost of the relevant reductions against more familiar benefits (those
associated with the reductions’ effect on what I have termed “avoidance
costs”). In the end, there was much reason to think that at least buyand-hold ordinary investors fell inside the circle of the harmed. That
those market participants invest in line with the consensus guidance of
the SEC and social science means that this observation is one that
challenges conventional thinking about information asymmetry and
investor protection more generally. Moreover, the implications for the
larger universe of ordinary investors as a whole were also disconcerting
given the typical sustained holding periods of major groups of ordinary
investors versus the short average holding periods in the market today.
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III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INVESTOR-PROTECTION DIVIDE AND THE
LAW
The nuanced positive conclusions about the reductions to
informational unevenness at the heart of modern securities law offered
above have considerable normative implications. The main ones relate
to the investor-protection divide and the appropriate focus of investorprotection efforts in the law. In this final Part, I examine each of these
sets of implications in turn.
A. Implications for the Investor-Protection Divide
For decades now, investor-protection advocates have maintained that
the core securities laws mitigate informational unevenness in obvious
ways, thereby helping ordinary investors.138 All the while, the law and
economics orthodoxy has asserted that these laws do little, if anything,
on this front.139 But the theories offered in the preceding Part tell us
much about the extent to which each of these competing views is
supported by reality.
Most strikingly, the relevant law and economics argument against the
core laws is understated. When it comes to at least buy-and-hold
ordinary investors, one must be dubious of the idea that the reductions
in information asymmetry these laws provide is even a neutral
proposition.140 Instead, there is a compelling story to be told in which
these reductions impose a serious cost on these investors — and harm
them on net.141 The law and economics orthodoxy has thus been too
meek on this front.
The other side of this same coin is that the investor-protection
advocates have overstated their case. The case for arguing that the
relevant information asymmetry (the increased amount that would exist
without the core securities laws) presents a significant problem for
ordinary investors as a whole should now seem far-fetched. This is for
two reasons. First, some significant portion of the ordinary investor
universe likely benefits from that asymmetry (and that portion is mostly
composed of those who are investing in exactly the way in which the
government and consensus view economists have told them they should
invest142). Second, there is much reason to be skeptical of the idea that

138
139
140
141
142

See supra notes 4, 6–10 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 5, 11–17 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.C.
See id.
See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
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there is any larger negative net effect of that asymmetry on ordinary
investors as a whole.143
Still, also inherent in my positive conclusions is that there are likely
many ordinary investors who are in fact helped by the laws at issue.144
That is because my analysis shows that information asymmetry on the
margin does harm some ordinary investors — namely, those who are
engaged in active trading.145 This group may even include those who
are engaged in especially active portfolio trading, depending mainly on
whether they prefer to shift from consumption to savings or vice versa
with more frequency than the marginal investor.146 These investors’
active trading provides them with benefits. Yet, information asymmetry
stings them because the reigning discount in the market is set by
investors with longer investment horizons, and is therefore insufficient
to address their information-asymmetry costs. Moreover, these same
ordinary investors — and more — also benefit from the reductions in
information asymmetry to the extent that those reductions reduce their
avoidance costs.
One could therefore argue that, if the goal is to protect ordinary
investors, pursuing disclosure, fraud, and insider trading law to limit
information asymmetry makes sense. After all, those laws will reduce
the extent to which some ordinary investors incur spread and/or
market-movement costs that are not negated by the prevailing market
discounts. And it will limit the extent to which those (and other)
ordinary investors lose out on the utility they would gain from portfolio
adjustments they would make in the absence of those costs, and the
extent to which they must allocate resources to trade with lower spread
and market-movement costs. That said, three significant limitations on
this thinking must be acknowledged.
First, the group of ordinary investors that is actually harmed by
information asymmetry on the margin (and therefore helped by the
reductions in information asymmetry provided by the securities laws)
might be small enough relative to those who are helped by that
asymmetry (and therefore hurt by the reductions) that the legal efforts
in focus would be of limited import to ordinary investors as a whole.
Just how likely is it that there is a sizeable enough portion of the
ordinary investor universe that trades in and out of stocks at a faster clip
than those investors whose conduct gives rise to average holding

143
144
145
146

See supra Part II.C.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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periods in the four-month range and average turnover rates of 100% and
higher?147 And how likely is it that the size of this group of ordinary
investors comes anywhere close to dominating that composed of longerterm ordinary investors? Avoidance-cost benefits must too be factored
in,148 but it is hard to paint this as some kind of seriously problematic
investor-protection picture.
Second, market forces alone might provide enough protection on this
front, thereby obviating the need to deploy disclosure, fraud, and
insider trading rules toward reducing information asymmetry to protect
ordinary investors. Firms have an incentive to reduce information
asymmetry.149 Reductions in such asymmetry decrease market
discounts that, by definition, harm the value of company stock.150 For
that reason, in the absence of these laws, firms should be expected to
disclose a large amount of information to the public, and to do so with
integrity.151 Whether or not that is the case turns on a larger debate that
has gone on for decades about market forces and these areas of law.152
147 See supra notes 56, 60–61 and accompanying text (discussing holding periods
and turnover rates today).
148 Supra Part II.A (discussing these costs of information asymmetry).
149 See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities
Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2367 (1998) [hereinafter Empowering Investors] (noting
empirical research on the power of capital markets to assess the impact of legal regimes
on investment returns and the “entrepreneurial motivation [of firms] to reduce capital
costs”); Ayres, supra note 20, at 952-53 (noting that “even before the federal securities
laws mandated honest disclosure of financial statements, firms attempted to precommit
to honesty by hiring independent accountants to verify their truth”); Mahoney, supra
note 13, at 647 (“Issuers of securities speak to the market often. Though some of the
information they provide is mandated by the federal securities laws, many of their
statements are made without legal compulsion.”).
150 See Amihud & Mendelson, Asset Pricing, supra note 102, at 246 (“The higher
yields required on higher-spread stocks give firms an incentive to increase the liquidity
of their securities, thus reducing their opportunity cost of capital. Consequently,
liquidity-increasing financial policies may increase the value of the firm.”); id.
(“[I]nformation disclosures may be construed as investments in increased liquidity.”);
id. at 224 (“[L]iquidity-increasing financial policies can reduce the firm’s opportunity
cost of capital . . . .”).
151 E.g., Ayres, supra note 20, at 946 (stating that if the law allowed firms to lie,
“market forces [would] drive virtually all firms to commit to honesty, and at least some
[would] commit to (or establish reputations for) remaining silent”).
152 For the view that private ordering is insufficient to bring about optimal
disclosure, see Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer
Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1999). But see EASTERBROOK
& FISCHEL, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 1, at 276-314; ROBERTA ROMANO, THE
ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM FOR SECURITIES REGULATION (2002);
Easterbrook & Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 1, at 709-13 (describing the
potential advantages of a market regime for securities disclosure law, but concluding
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But even if one sides with the proponents of private ordering, it is hard
to imagine that firm managers would sufficiently refrain from the
private gains associated with insider trading in order to reduce the scope
of illiquidity discounts in the market in the name of reducing the
company cost of capital. Moreover, disclosure by competitors and other
firms decreases information asymmetry, and firms may therefore suffer
from a collective action problem when it comes to finding a sufficient
level of disclosure for investor-protection purposes. Consequently, one
would think that the securities laws, at a minimum, provide some
material reduction to information asymmetry beyond what markets
would accomplish on their own. But it is nevertheless likely that market
forces alone would do much to mitigate the effect of information
asymmetry discounts that are too small for some ordinary investors
(i.e., the frequent traders), thereby limiting the appeal of legal efforts
aimed at protecting even that one subset of the ordinary investor
universe that is clearly made better off by the reductions traceable to
current law.
Third, any relevant investor-protection gains for the portion of
investors that is harmed by information asymmetry would come at a
cost to other ordinary investors. This final point follows from one of the
main points of this Article, found in the previous Part’s conclusion that
the reductions provided by the core securities laws were likely costly
for at least significant portions of the ordinary investor universe —
including the portion investing in the very way ordinary investors are
told to invest by the SEC and social science.
It is worth noting that if the marginal investor is a buy-and-hold one
who does nothing more than index the market as a whole, then the
general position of the law and economics orthodoxy (i.e., that the
reductions do little if anything for ordinary investors) may be correct.
But even in this unlikely scenario, one would still have to consider what
the reductions did to help various ordinary investors in terms of
alleviating trade-avoidance costs. In the end, an interesting debate,
informed by the framework set forth here, might ensue between the
orthodoxy and investor-protection advocates.
All this is not to say that there aren’t other arguments to be made in
favor of the core securities laws from an ordinary-investor fairness
and/or protection perspective. For one thing, a broader set of fairness
and investor-protection issues beyond the information-asymmetry-

that, based on the empirical research thus far, it is uncertain whether leaving the issue
to the market is actually better than the status quo); Romano, Empowering Investors,
supra note 149.
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based one in focus in this Article153 can be identified.154 Those who have
a broader view of investor protection may nevertheless still take issue
with uneven informational footing in the stock market. For example,
for them, any inability for ordinary direct-trading investors to have
equal access to new information (and thus equal trading profit
opportunities, if not outcomes), may in and of itself pose a problematic
unfairness, no matter what that access means for the number at the
bottom of 401(k) statements. For another, even if it mainly turns on the
theory detailed above and the corresponding facts about investor types
and time horizons, the precise pros and cons of information asymmetry
on the margin for the groups noted above remains an unanswered
empirical question.155 But the discussion provided in this Section shows
why an investor-protection dialogue informed by the nuanced positive
theories set forth in the previous Part is in order.156 Indeed, if nothing
else, all of the above description and analysis shows that the
conventional wisdom on information asymmetry and the protection of
ordinary investors would benefit from this newly added nuance to the
scholarly literature on securities law.

153 See supra notes 2–3 (limiting my focus to the relationship between the core efforts
to curb stock-market information asymmetry, on the one hand, and ordinary-investor
wellbeing on the other).
154 For an overview of that broader set of issues, see Michael D. Guttentag, Protection
from What? Investor Protection and the JOBS Act, 13 UC DAVIS BUS. L.J. 207 (2013). See
also Haeberle, Information-Asymmetry Story, supra note 19 (focusing on the larger social
costs of stock market information asymmetry).
155 See supra Part II.C.
156 Interestingly, even if the reductions to information asymmetry at issue harm buyand-hold ordinary investors on net (or even the larger universe of ordinary investors on
net), investor welfare arguments might still be used to argue against any change to the
status quo. This is because any such change that increased information asymmetry
would reduce the value of the existing investment positions of all ordinary investors. After
all, the reigning discount for information-asymmetry-based illiquidity is based on
current levels (and expected levels) of the same. See supra Part II.B. An exogenous
change that unexpectedly increased those levels (and therefore increased the market
discount) would increase expected returns on existing investment positions. But in so
doing, it would reduce the value of those positions for at least those who already hold
them and who plan on selling out of them sooner rather than later. Investments made
there forward by the relevant ordinary investors would, all else being equal, have higher
expected returns without having to incur that reduction in value. But, a strange debate
might result, where the interests of many current ordinary investors are weighed against
those of these future ordinary investors.
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B. Implications for the Law
The theories should also change at least the focus of investorprotection efforts, as they cut strongly in favor of shifting any such focus
away from the core securities laws and to areas of regulation that have
received far less attention.157
1.

Shifting Away From the Core Securities Laws

The theories of this Article do not question the more general support
in American society for laws that protect ordinary investors. And the
SEC’s mission is to “protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient
markets, and facilitate capital formation.”158 Consistent with this, the
SEC is empowered by Congress to make rules pursuant to an investorprotection standard159 — and to do so even if that means eschewing
larger social considerations. Congress can do the same under, at a
minimum, its Commerce Clause powers. But given the conclusions
offered above, the focus of any such effort with an eye on additional
regulation should be moved from the core securities laws to other less
prominent areas. A brief discussion of insider trading law and the
investor-protection promise of areas of securities law that receive far
less attention makes this point.
Insider trading law has traditionally garnered much attention from
scholarly and popular audiences alike. A good amount of the attention
has been on the extent to which this law protects ordinary investors,
with the investor-protection advocates arguing for robust trading
restrictions160 and many law and economics critics supporting
legalization.161 But the theories set out above demonstrate that,

157 My theories do not touch on the value of the core securities laws for ordinary
investors in the IPO market. See supra note 2. It is possible that further reductions to
information asymmetry that those laws might provide in that market would be worth
pursuing as well.
158 What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (June 10, 2013) (emphasis added),
https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html.
159 E.g., Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, The Efficiency Criterion for Securities Regulation: Investor
Welfare or Total Surplus? 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 85, 94 (2015) (“[T]he SEC can engage in
rulemaking to promote either investor protection or a more general ‘public interest’
goal.”). Interestingly, the agency generally pursues the former approach. See id. at 90
(“At best, the SEC can be seen as analyzing its rules’ net effects on the economic welfare
of its primary constituents: investors.”); id. at 126 (“[T]he SEC has historically
employed the investor welfare approach.”).
160 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
161 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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paradoxically, the imposition of insider trading law should be
disconcerting from an investor-protection perspective.
For those that have followed the academic and policy debate in this
area, a notable observation should follow. For about a half century now,
investor-protection advocates have maintained that the trading
restriction protects ordinary investors, albeit at a cost to price accuracy.
In other words, price accuracy has to be traded off in order to generate
these ordinary investor gains. Highly regarded theoretical work from
the not too distant past presented a serious challenge to the
conventional wisdom that insider trading law was bad for price
accuracy, arguing just the opposite: that the restriction was justified
based on its positive impact on price accuracy.162 If credited, that theory
along with the one presented in this Article show that there is a
compelling story to be told in which the conventional wisdom has been
upside down. In reality, by restricting insider trading, one could argue,
the law likely trades off well-being for at least buy-and-hold ordinary
investors in return for higher levels of price accuracy. Glibly put, even
if not by original intention, insider trading law throws the ordinary
investors under the bus in order to obtain more accurate pricing and its
benefits for the wider economy.
The insider trading example is just one such illustration of my point.
Other aspects of the core securities laws would provide similar ones.
One might look to the latest additions to the Regulation S-K’s disclosure
requirements, or the controversial overlay of private securities fraud
litigation under the Section 10(b) for analogous stories.
Ultimately, whatever the precise trade-offs at play with disclosure,
fraud, and insider trading law (and various individual aspects of those
core areas of securities law), the theories and analysis provided in this
Article show that one should be dubious of investor-protection stories
that center on these laws’ effect on information asymmetry in the
secondary market.
2.

Shifting Toward Less Prominent Areas of Securities Law

The conclusions offered earlier also reveal the promise held by lesserstudied areas of the law. Thinking briefly about two such areas (trading
market structure and investment advice duties) in this context makes
the point.
The analysis in this work and a related series of recent works163 can
be built on to show how the regulation of the structure of the stock
162
163

See Goshen & Parchomovsky, On Insider Trading, supra note 9.
See supra note 18; infra note 182.
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market can help ordinary investors avoid the costs of information
asymmetry.164 For example, despite much criticism of off-exchange
trading platforms in policymaker and popular circles alike, the above
analysis and conclusions show how those platforms could help ordinary
investors avoid these costs. Many such platforms separate ordinary
investor trading from sophisticated investor trading to a high degree.
They can therefore help ordinary investors avoid the spread and marketmovement costs that now reign on exchanges.165 This is because the
spreads and market movements that are most relevant to a trader are
those associated with the venue on which she is trading, as each trading
venue will reflect the informational characteristics of the trading it
hosts.166 So, to the extent off-exchange platforms can segregate out
ordinary investor trading, they can help ordinary investors avoid those
costs — thereby protecting them in meaningful ways.
Indeed, at least one group of ordinary investors — that engaging in
direct trading through retail-level brokerage accounts — is especially
able to avoid information asymmetry costs thanks to this market
structure. These individuals have almost 100% of their orders to buy
and sell stock on demand internalized by broker-dealers rather than
routed to exchanges and the like.167 Because these orders are generally
assumed to be uninformed,168 the market makers that trade opposite
them are willing to provide their services at tighter spreads and subject
164 More bang for ordinary investors’ buck might be obtained by focusing instead on
the structure of other securities markets, such as those for corporate or municipal
bonds. But the example in the text nevertheless makes the present point: that the
investor-protection focus relating to ordinary investors who invest in the stock market
(if any focus) should shift away from the core securities laws.
165 See Kevin S. Haeberle, Stock-Market Law and the Accuracy of Public Companies’
Stock Prices, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 121, 148-50 (2015) [hereinafter Stock-Market
Law] (explaining how these platforms help ordinary investors avoid information
asymmetry costs, and why that help reduces the information trader incentive to generate
fundamental value analysis, and, in turn, price accuracy and its larger social benefits).
166 See supra Parts I.D, II.A (discussing market makers and their response to
asymmetrically informed trade).
167 See, e.g., Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, 75 Fed. Reg. 3,594, 3,600
(Apr. 21, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242) (“A review of the order routing
disclosures required by Rule 606 of Regulation NMS of eight broker-dealers with
significant retail customer accounts reveals that nearly 100% of their customer market
orders are routed to OTC market makers.”).
168 E.g., Christine A. Parlour & Uday Rajan, Payment for Order Flow, 68 J. FIN. ECON.
379, 381 (2003) (“Retail order flow is widely believed to be uninformed.”); Comment
Letter from Suhas Daftuar, Managing Dir., Hudson River Trading LLC, to Elizabeth M.
Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 1 (Nov. 30, 2011) (“Retail investors’ orders
are generally considered to be uninformed, in that they are unlikely to cause or have
information about short-term price movements.”).
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to less sensitive price-movement triggers.169 This translates to lower
information asymmetry costs for these investors. Consequently,
assuming sufficient competition, it is likely that these particular
ordinary investors are able to purchase stocks at bid and ask prices that
reflect less information-asymmetry-based illiquidity than present
elsewhere in the market, yet that are valued at a lower price thanks to
that same information asymmetry.170 Moreover, because these direct
trading individual investors generally do not transact in large size, they
do not incur market-movement costs. The import of these final points
is considerable, as internalization of these orders is thought to cover a
significant portion of all stock trading today,171 including the vast
majority of all individual-investor, retail-level trading.172
Lastly, regulation of the market for investment advice has similar
potential. One need only think of the consumer protection issues
associated with conflicted advice from brokers to see this potential,173

169 See supra Part I & Part II.A; see, e.g., Daftuar, supra note 168, at 1 (noting that
internalization is “generally driven by internalizers’ ability to discriminate among
potential customers, taking the other side of retail orders which, unlike orders from
proprietary trading firms or institutional investors, are unlikely to have short-term
adverse impact on the liquidity provider”).
170 See generally Kevin S. Haeberle, Discrimination Platforms, 42 J. CORP. L. 809
(2017) [hereinafter Discrimination Platforms] (discussing the distinct trading
environments at exchanges and various types of off-exchange platforms).
171 It has been said that around 20% of all reported stock trading is internalized. E.g.,
Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, supra note 167, at 15; Dark Pools,
Internalization, and Equity Market Quality, ISSUE BRIEF (CFA Inst., Charlottesville, Va.),
Nov. 2012, at 1, 3. The majority of this internalization is thought to be attributable to
direct trading ordinary investors, with more no doubt traceable to those same investors,
albeit indirectly through investment funds whose orders are internalized.
172 See Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, supra note 167, at 21. Other
ordinary investor-friendly devices of the contemporary stock market provide similar
benefits, and may (taken together) provide yet additional reasons for thinking that
information asymmetry on the margin is helping at least buy-and-hold ordinary
investors today. For example, patient ordinary investors are able to transact at the
midpoint of the bid-ask spread thanks to “midpoint liquidity orders” offered by all
major exchanges. This saves these investors from both spread and market-movement
costs. The complexity of these devices and the ways in which they help direct trading
and indirect trading ordinary investors avoid these costs is beyond the scope of this
Article. But I describe them in detail in making related points in my contemporaneous
work on information asymmetry from a social welfare perspective. See Haeberle,
Information-Asymmetry Story, supra note 19.
173 Recent efforts by the Obama-era Department of Labor and the Trump-era SEC
perhaps reflect at least implicit agreement with these points. For the recent rule adopted
by the SEC, see Regulation Best Interest: The Broker-Dealer Standard of Conduct, 84
Fed. Reg. 39,178 (Aug. 9, 2019) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). For an overview
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or, perhaps more controversially, the fees associated with active mutual
fund investments.174 Whether or not these types of regulatory changes
targeted at this distinct market generate additional social wealth or just
transfer existing amounts, they should thus be appealing to investorprotection advocates.
Of course, taken together, the central findings of this Article and the
investor welfare standard noted earlier in this Section suggest that the
SEC could reduce the scope of the core securities laws in the name of
protecting at least buy-and-hold ordinary investors. Indeed, the agency
could even mandate disclosure maximums, encourage corporate lying,
and green light more insider trading. But for three main reasons, these
approaches do not follow from my analysis. First, whatever the state of
norms today, these approaches are unlikely for obvious political
reasons. Second, for perhaps most, the larger positive role of the core
securities laws175 compels something roughly along their current form.
Third, my central positive claims in this Article are merely that the
reductions in information asymmetry provided by the core securities
laws likely impose a cost on buy-and-hold ordinary investors while
conferring only limited benefits, and that for closely related reasons we
should be concerned about their effect on ordinary investors as a
whole.176 Thus, the most attractive normative argument is for the
investor-protection focus to be shifted to other areas of securities
regulation rather than for considering a rollback of the core ones.
***
This Part discussed the most notable policy prescriptions that flowed
from Part II’s positive theories. Given the disconcerting picture of the
relationship between the reductions to information asymmetry
provided by the core securities laws and at least buy-and-hold ordinaryinvestor well-being drawn in Part II, I showed that changes are in order
for both thinking and action. In particular, this Part laid a foundation
for a more informed discussion about information asymmetry and the
protection of ordinary investors than that which has reigned to date. It
also provided a nudge in favor of (and an accompanying roadmap for)
shifting any focus on efforts to protect ordinary investors in the stock
of the DOL effort and what it might have done for ordinary investors, see Benjamin P.
Edwards, Conflicts & Capital Allocation, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 181, 224-26 (2017).
174 See supra note 50 and accompanying text (suggesting the existence of “closet
indexing” by “active” funds).
175 See supra notes 11, 51–52 and accompanying text (noting the efficiency benefits
that the core securities laws are said to generate).
176 See supra Part II.C.
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market away from the core securities laws and to less prominent areas
of regulation.
Of course, as first noted at the outset of this Article, there are larger
costs and benefits of laws that reduce stock market information
asymmetry. But those costs and benefits are not the subject of this work.
Likewise, any change to the existing laws would likely change the
quantity and quality of trading by ordinary investors and others, thereby
bringing about secondary and tertiary effects on ordinary investors and
others. For example, if the laws were rolled back, buy-and-hold
ordinary investors may find themselves better off as investors, yet worse
of as members of society. After all, a rollback of the core laws would
increase information asymmetry on the margin, and therefore harm
shorter-term traders. To the extent information traders consequently
withdrew from the market and prices became less accurate, capital
might be misallocated and firms mismanaged. These observations
provide further reason — beyond mere political appeal — to avoid
tinkering with the core securities laws in the name of investor
protection, and to instead shift much of the investor-protection focus in
the stock market to less prominent areas of regulation, such as those
discussed in this Part.
Lastly, as these final thoughts indicate, this Article’s theories scratch
the surface of their even larger implications. I hope to touch more on
them in my broader work on information asymmetry and social
welfare,177 as well as in other planned work. But it is worth noting here
that the magnitude of the social effects of significant change to the
reductions in information asymmetry provided by the core securities
might be far larger with respect to something not in focus above. In this
Article, I have focused on investor protection along with some added
nuance about the larger efficiency concerns of the securities laws. But
my analysis has considerable implications for the relationship between
the core securities laws, on the one hand, and the composition of the
ownership base of corporate America, on the other. If the reductions to
information asymmetry at issue are taking away investment return from
longer-term investors, then they are likely increasing the proportion of
public company shares owned by shorter-term investors.178 After all, by
reducing information asymmetry, they make shares more liquid and
thus more attractive to those investors. They may therefore be pushing
the managers of those shareholders toward a shorter-term approach.
Given the central emphasis in both economics and corporate law on
177
178

See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
See supra note 120.
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long-term value maximization for public firms, this additional longoverlooked effect of the core securities laws, if substantiated as a matter
of theory and/or empirics, would constitute an enormous elephant in
the securities law room. Indeed, any such negative effects of the
securities laws along these lines might dwarf even the considerable
investor-protection ones identified in this Article.
CONCLUSION
Conclusory statements about securities law and the protection of
ordinary investors have long been commonplace among policymakers
and scholars. For investor-protection advocates, those statements have
embraced a view of the world in which discrepancies in knowledge
among stock market participants very much matter for ordinary
investors, meaning that disclosure, fraud, and insider trading laws do
too. For the law and economics orthodoxy, the statements have instead
largely dismissed the idea of these core securities laws serving any
significant investor-protection role relating to ordinary investors. For
decades, these two sides of this investor-protection divide have
generally talked past each other, with neither offering close enough
analysis of how information asymmetry actually affects ordinary
investors.
This Article attempted to close this investor-protection gap and move
forward thinking on securities law. It did so by undertaking a detailed
review of economic relationships between stock market participants
with an eye on the costs of information asymmetry for ordinary
investors. This review revealed that the reductions to information
asymmetry provided by the core securities laws likely take away
investment return for at least buy-and-hold ordinary investors —
investors who are investing in accordance with the guidance of the SEC
and the lessons of social science. All the while, the same reductions
provided only limited assistance to these same investors. The result for
ordinary investors as a whole was also disconcerting, although less clear
on net.
The main relevant implications of these theories for the investorprotection divide and the content of the law were also significant.
Perhaps most notably for the former, the law and economics orthodoxy
has understated its case against the core of modern securities law as an
area of investor protection. With respect to the latter, much more
ordinary investor bang for the buck might be generated by shifting focus
away from that core and toward more peripheral areas of regulation.
Whether the majority of any resulting work comes from those who
specialize in securities law as opposed to consumer protection, contract
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law, or fiduciary law is not clear. But these positive and normative
conclusions have made room for legal improvement by giving much
reason to think that the real ordinary investor killer, if any, is still on
the loose.
Of course, legal efforts to reduce information asymmetry could be
driven by the goal of improving overall welfare, as opposed to simply
ordinary investor welfare.179 Although beyond the scope of this work,
the conventional wisdom appears to be that the reductions in
information asymmetry provided by the core securities laws give rise to
net social benefits well beyond any traceable to ordinary investors.180
Or, reducing information asymmetry might improve confidence in the
market and mitigate larger perceptions of the stock market as an unfair
social institution. Pursuing the core securities laws to limit those
perceptions might therefore be desirable to many, even if it means
indulging false assumptions about the laws’ effects on ordinary
investors.
Stepping back to more broadly view this Article’s examination,
theoretical conclusions, and legal implications provides a final, broader
insight. The study shows what can be learned from careful examinations
of the mechanics and economics of markets. Here, the focus was on
what is perhaps the most prominent securities market in the world, and
the precise harms key suppliers of long-term investment capital do and
do not suffer as a result of the presence of better-informed traders in
that market. But this approach can be used to reveal much more. For
example, related studies can be pursued, such as the one mentioned
several times above that contemplates the scope of the larger social costs
and benefits of stock-market information asymmetry.181 The approach
can likewise be used to examine other areas of securities law beyond the
core ones mandating disclosure, prohibiting fraud, and restricting
insider trading. This observation is apparent from what can be seen as
an emerging area of legal scholarship — of which this work is a now
part — on a wide array of securities laws seen from a market179

See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
E.g., supra note 150 and accompanying text. But see, e.g., Romano, Empowering
Investors, supra note 149 (arguing that private ordering could obtain a more optimal
result). Interestingly, the analysis offered in this Article suggests that the ordinary
investor effects of the core securities laws may very well constitute a cost in any such
larger cost-benefit analysis. All else being equal, any such analysis might therefore
contain much less weight in the benefit column and much more in the cost one than
present in existing evaluations. Also interestingly, the point raised in the final paragraph
in Part III above regarding the ownership base of public companies may present a
challenge to the convention wisdom about the securities laws and social welfare.
181 Supra notes 19, 82, 97, 111, 154 & 172.
180
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microstructure perspective.182 Given the insights arising from this
literature on the stock market and its regulation, one must wonder what
such examinations would tell us about the validity of common views
specific to the regulation of markets for things both far more simple and
complex than public company stock.

182 See supra note 18 (discussing this emerging literature and its lag behind the
related literature on mainstream finance and the law). For specific works incorporating
principles of microstructure into the legal literature over the past five years (listed in
reverse chronological order), see, for example, Robert P. Bartlett & Justin McCrary, How
Rigged Are Stock Markets? Evidence from Microsecond Timestamps, J. FIN. MARKETS
(forthcoming 2020) (examining high-frequency trading practices); Haeberle &
Henderson, New Market-Based Approach, supra note 6 (proposing the construction and
use of a well-regulated information market to address the core disclosure, fraud, and
insider-trading problems of modern securities law); Paul Mahoney & Gabriel
Rauterberg, The Regulation of Trading Markets: A Survey and Evaluation, in SECURITIES
MARKET ISSUES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 221-281 (2018); Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R.
Glosten & Gabriel V. Rauterberg, Stock Market Manipulation and Its Regulation, 35 YALE
J. ON REG. 67 (2018); Kevin S. Haeberle & M. Todd Henderson, Making a Market for
Corporate Disclosure, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 383 (2018) (arguing that a well-regulated
information market would generate more corporate disclosure, released more
frequently, in improved formats); Informed Trading, supra note 43 (thinking about a
variety of information-based trading practices and rules from a microstructure
perspective); Fox & Haeberle, supra note 102 (setting forth an evaluative framework
for judging a range of stock-market practices and their regulation); Discrimination
Platforms, supra note 170 (examining the trade transparency and trader-access practices
at exchanges and alternative trading systems today); Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R.
Glosten & Gabriel V. Rauterberg, The New Stock Market: Sense and Nonsense, 65 DUKE
L.J. 191 (2015) (examining and evaluating controversial stock market practices);
Haeberle, Stock-Market Law, supra note 165.

